[PATCH] KEYS: fix userspace buffer overflow in keyctl_pkey_e_d_s()

From: Guicai Ma

Date: Thu Nov 19 2026 - 21:25:04 EST


Commit cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()")
changed keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() to set params->out_len to the maximum
output size of the operation instead of uparams.out_len, so that the
kernel buffer allocated in keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() is large enough.

Because uparams.out_len is no longer kept, keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() copies
ret bytes to _out without checking whether the result fits in the
caller's buffer. If a smaller out_len was passed, copy_to_user() writes
past the end of _out instead of failing with -EOVERFLOW.

uparams.out_len cannot simply be required to be at least the maximum
output size in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(), since KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT
with enc=pkcs1 can return a plaintext shorter than max_dec_size into a
matching smaller buffer.

Pass uparams.out_len back to keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() and return -EOVERFLOW
before copy_to_user() if ret exceeds it.

Fixes: cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Guicai Ma <maguicai@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
index e7121523b9c9..31bd55c4ca70 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get(key_serial_t id,
static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
const char __user *_info,
int op,
- struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+ struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
+ u32 *user_out_len)
{
struct keyctl_pkey_params uparams;
struct kernel_pkey_query info;
@@ -183,6 +184,8 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
}

params->in_len = uparams.in_len;
+ if (user_out_len)
+ *user_out_len = uparams.out_len;

switch (op) {
case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
@@ -264,10 +267,12 @@ long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
void __user *_out)
{
struct kernel_pkey_params params;
+ u32 user_out_len;
void *in, *out;
long ret;

- ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, op, &params);
+ ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, op, &params,
+ &user_out_len);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_params;

@@ -310,6 +315,10 @@ long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
if (ret < 0)
goto error_out;

+ if (ret > user_out_len) {
+ ret = -EOVERFLOW;
+ goto error_out;
+ }
if (copy_to_user(_out, out, ret) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;

@@ -349,7 +358,7 @@ long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
long ret;

ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
- &params);
+ &params, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_free_params;