Re: [PATCH] mm/secretmem: Keep locked memory accounting until inode eviction
From: David Hildenbrand (Arm)
Date: Fri Nov 20 2026 - 04:32:14 EST
On 11/19/26 08:36, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 11:59:57PM +0100, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
>> On 10/30/26 16:24, Baek Kyu, Kim wrote:
>>> A secretmem inode can outlive its original file. An O_PATH descriptor
>>> opened through /proc/self/fd keeps the inode and its unevictable folios
>>> alive after the mapping and original descriptor are closed. The file
>>> release path nevertheless drops the locked-memory charge, allowing the
>>> same user to reuse RLIMIT_MEMLOCK while those folios remain allocated.
>>>
>>> Move private-state and locked-memory accounting cleanup to inode eviction,
>>> after truncating the page cache. Keep secretmem_users active over the same
>>> lifetime so that the hibernation guard covers retained secret pages. Let
>>> iput() handle file-creation failures and tolerate an inode with no private
>>> state.
>
> I don't like the last part, see below.
>
>>> Fixes: 97d34aa65c29 ("mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages")
>>> Signed-off-by: Baek Kyu, Kim <pocj8ur4in@xxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> Lorenzo, Mike, this problem seems real to me. Can you take a look?
>
> Yep, it's real and the fix is correct.
>
>>> ---
>>> On an arm64 QEMU guest with an 8 KiB RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, an O_PATH reference
>>> retained two secretmem pages. The baseline dropped the charge to zero and
>>> allowed a further one-page fault; the patch kept both pages charged and
>>> rejected that fault until the last path reference closed. The Image
>>> was built with KASAN and lockdep. Hibernation, other architectures,
>>> and long-running concurrency were not tested.
>>>
>>> mm/secretmem.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
>>> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
>>> index 384f5cfc457f..fa8be360bd2a 100644
>>> --- a/mm/secretmem.c
>>> +++ b/mm/secretmem.c
>>> @@ -185,18 +185,14 @@ static void secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(struct inode *inode)
>>> {
>>> struct secretmem_inode_state *state = inode->i_private;
>>>
>>> + if (!state)
>>> + return;
>>> +
>
> Its really not obvious how we can get here with state == NULL.
>
> And since it is needed only for error path in secretmem_file_create(), I
> suggest rearranging the initialization so that we never get here with NULL
> state.
> Allocate the state before creating the inode and adjust error handling in
> secretmem_file_create() so that we always get to iput with valid i_private.
Ack, Kim, can you resend (putting me on CC ?)
--
Cheers,
David