Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots

From: Jarkko Sakkinen

Date: Fri Nov 20 2026 - 08:14:03 EST


On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 01:32:57PM +0100, Alexander Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> On Thu, 2026-11-19 at 15:27 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 2:50 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 9:30 AM Josef Bacik <josef@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 9:46 AM Andy Lutomirski
> > > > <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > > cells: The dance where I create an anonymous mountns, mount
> > > > > stuff into
> > > > > it, and then attach it to the cell is cute.  But I think the
> > > > > userns
> > > > > interaction is wrong: you are making me assemble all the mounts
> > > > > in
> > > > > *my* userns and then clone the entire tree into a fresh, non-
> > > > > anonymous
> > > > > mountns bound to the current userns.  And that clone operation
> > > > > is not
> > > > > free and serves no actual practical purpose.
> > > >
> > > > The copy buys us nothing, agreed.  That's just what the mount API
> > > > gives
> > > > me to work with today, it's not something cells wants.  If I
> > > > could make
> > > > an empty mount namespace and fill it by fd I'd use that, the
> > > > "root" slot
> > > > takes a mount namespace fd already.  Extending the API for that
> > > > makes
> > > > sense to me on its own.
> > > >
> > > > The mount namespace staying with the builder's userns is on
> > > > purpose
> > > > though, that's what keeps the cell from mounting anything no
> > > > matter what
> > > > capabilities it was given.  The builder sets the tree up and
> > > > hands it
> > > > over, so the cell only ever has what it was given, and the mount
> > > > code
> > > > isn't something it can attack from the inside.
> > >
> > > I don't get it.
> > >
> > > Using the builder's user namespace means that the contained
> > > processes
> > > can't be ns_capable on mntns->userns.  But this solves very few
> > > problems unless you also deny the contained processes the ability
> > > to
> > > unshare userns and make a new mountns, and if you can do that,
> > > surely
> > > you can also deny the ability to modify the mount namespace.
> > >
> > > As just one example, a mount namespace could have a little flag to
> > > say
> > > that it's *in* one userns but its owner is a different userns.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > > cells: I find it *incredibly annoying* that one generally
> > > > > cannot put
> > > > > new mounts into an existing container using most existing
> > > > > container
> > > > > managers.  I hit this on a surprisingly regular basis.  You
> > > > > seem to be
> > > > > baking this into the whole cells design.  Why?
> > > >
> > > > By design.  Allowing changes to a running container is what
> > > > causes the
> > > > problems.  If you need another mount, tear it down and build it
> > > > again.
> > >
> > > What problems?
>
> Dear friends,
>
> Dear Andy,
>
> >
> > I'll add:
> >
> > On a non-container Linux system, you can hot-add a removable drive.
> > On a Linux-hosted VM, you can hot-add all kinds of devices, with or
> > without the help of the hypervisor.  (The hypervisor can hot-add a
> > device, and the guest can mount network devices or newly added USB
> > devices on a port that was already assigned, etc.)
> >
> > For some reason, on Docker and its sort-of-clones, approximately the
> > best you can do is rbind in a directory and then mount things into
> > that directory from outside.  This is sad.
>
> +1
>
> I guess the root reason here is what you've mentioned - for VMs we have
> a clear separation of the host-side (hypervisor can hot-plug a device
> to be visible on a PCI bus, for example) and some agent on the guest
> side can react on this change and do something depending on how VM's
> owner has configured it.
>
> For containers, we usually don't have an agent (at least in LXC, OpenVZ
> and Docker too). So it is a container manager's work to figure out how
> to hotplug a new filesystem for example and where to place the mount.
> And this was always a reason for some crazy security issues, when some
> privileged process on the host was entering a container's namespaces
> (partially) and then suddenly become trace-able or bring some host FDs
> (and these FDs could be a way to escape via (struct file*)->f_cred
> permission delegation model).
>
> Another reason is that in VM you hotplug a device, while in container
> you can only hotplug a mounted filesystem. And for devices we don't
> care under which major/minor they land and so on - again, because we
> have systemd for example and it can figure this out. For filesystem we
> need to know where to place in in a mount namespace tree from the
> beginning (we still don't allow mounting a block-device based
> filesystems inside user namespaces).
>
> I really like your point and that would be great if we can solve this
> somehow in a new design.

This is for v4 (latest).

MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS takes any nsfs CLONE_NEWNS fd, and populates
CLONE_EMPTY_MNTNS directly and attaches live submounts without setns()
and FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS mounts FS_USERNS_MOUNT filesystems unprivileged
without entering userns.

The gaps would be open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) gating (it's now against
host), uid_map/gid_map prepopulation and a flag to deny mount table
changes inside rootns() container while keeping external hot-mounts
enabled.

Those are totally addressable issues.

Br, Jarkko