Re: [PATCH v2 net] mac802154: fix uninit-value in ieee802154_header_create()
From: Miquel Raynal
Date: Fri Nov 20 2026 - 08:41:42 EST
On 20/11/2026 at 15:45:37 +07, Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> During fuzz testing, the following issue was discovered:
>
> BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:54 [inline]
> BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa62/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
> ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:54 [inline]
> ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa62/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
> ieee802154_header_create+0xa83/0xd20 net/mac802154/iface.c:396
> wpan_dev_hard_header include/net/cfg802154.h:525 [inline]
> dgram_sendmsg+0xc6d/0x15d0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:677
> ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xd0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:96
> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
> __sock_sendmsg+0x2f3/0x360 net/socket.c:726
> ____sys_sendmsg+0x960/0xc30 net/socket.c:2581
> ___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2635
> __sys_sendmmsg+0x33c/0x950 net/socket.c:2724
> __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2751 [inline]
> __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2748 [inline]
> __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xc6/0x150 net/socket.c:2748
> x64_sys_call+0x12a8/0x3cf0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [inline]
> do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
>
> Uninit was stored to memory at:
> ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:51 [inline]
> ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa5b/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
> ieee802154_header_create+0xa83/0xd20 net/mac802154/iface.c:396
> wpan_dev_hard_header include/net/cfg802154.h:525 [inline]
> dgram_sendmsg+0xc6d/0x15d0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:677
> ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xd0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:96
> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
> __sock_sendmsg+0x2f3/0x360 net/socket.c:726
> ____sys_sendmsg+0x960/0xc30 net/socket.c:2581
> ___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2635
> __sys_sendmmsg+0x33c/0x950 net/socket.c:2724
> __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2751 [inline]
> __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2748 [inline]
> __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xc6/0x150 net/socket.c:2748
> x64_sys_call+0x12a8/0x3cf0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:310
> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [inline]
> do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
>
> Both ieee802154_header_create() and mac802154_header_create() declare
> struct ieee802154_hdr hdr on the stack and clear only hdr.fc via
> memset. This leaves hdr.sec uninitialized.
>
> There are two ways uninitialized hdr.sec fields can be read:
>
> 1. ieee802154_header_create() had a pre-existing assignment:
>
> hdr.fc.security_enabled = cb->secen;
>
> This could set security_enabled = 1 from a stale cb->secen (e.g.,
> after WPAN_SECURITY_ON followed by WPAN_SECURITY_DEFAULT), even when
> mac802154_set_header_security() returns without initializing hdr.sec.
> ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr() would then read uninitialized hdr.sec.
>
> 2. mac802154_set_header_security() never writes sec.frame_counter.
> ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr() copies it from the stack into the skb
> before mac802154_llsec_encrypt() sets the real value. If encryption
> fails, or via AF_PACKET taps in dev_queue_xmit_nit(), the
> uninitialized bytes are exposed to userspace.
>
> Fix both issues by replacing memset(&hdr.fc, ...) with
> memset(&hdr, ...) in both functions, which zeros hdr.sec entirely
> before mac802154_set_header_security() is called. The stale
> hdr.fc.security_enabled assignment is also removed as it is now
> superseded by the full zero-initialization.
>
> Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
>
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=60a66d44892b66b56545
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=23f21e76e9d2d1ed587cb5e71515260d6d025b63
> Fixes: f30be4d53cad ("mac802154: integrate llsec with wpan devices")
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Signed-off-by: Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@xxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@xxxxxxxxxxx>