Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Forward unimplemented hypercalls to userspace

From: Sean Christopherson

Date: Fri Nov 20 2026 - 13:17:52 EST


On Fri, Nov 13, 2026, David Woodhouse wrote:
> On 13 November 2026 10:10:40 GMT-07:00, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >On Fri, Nov 13, 2026, David Woodhouse wrote:
> >> From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >>
> >> KVM implements a fixed set of Hyper-V hypercalls and fails every other
> >> code with HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_CODE. A VMM that wants to
> >> implement more of the TLFS, such as the VSM hypercalls Windows uses for
> >> Virtualization Based Security, never sees them.
> >>
> >> This series adds KVM_CAP_HYPERV_FORWARD_HCALL. As with KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM
> >> and KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION returns a bitmask of
> >> features and KVM_ENABLE_CAP takes the subset to enable, rejecting any
> >> bit the kernel does not report. The first feature,
> >> KVM_HYPERV_HCALL_FORWARD_UNKNOWN, sends the hypercalls KVM does not
> >> implement, and extended hypercalls in fast form, out through the
> >> existing KVM_EXIT_HYPERV_HCALL exit, whose format does not change at
> >> all.
> >
> >I'm not a fan of fowarding unknown hypercalls. It seems like it would be quite
> >easy to end up with a mess where it's difficult for KVM to implement "native"
> >support without breaking userspace.
> >
> >How much code (and ongoing churn) would it be to add an allowlist of hypercalls
> >to forward to userspace? And then obviously require userspace to configure its
> >forwarding "intercepts".
>
> I'm following the model we used for Xen support, where the default assumption
> is that we do everything in userspace, then accelerate only what's absolutely
> necessary in the kernel.

Oh, right. I was worried about people getting clever and abusing the Hyper-V
handling to implement bespoke, out-of-tree hypercalls, but that ship has sailed.

> Userspace can opt *in* to having the kernel support certain hypercalls, and
> later patches waiting in the wings already add the in-kernel VTL switching
> enabled via a bitmask when enabling the capability.

Oh yeah, duh. We need a capability either way.