Re: [RFC PATCH v6 05/26] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns
From: bot+bpf-ci
Date: Sat Nov 21 2026 - 21:14:02 EST
> mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns
TL;DR: Nit only, not a bug: the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check on ns->user_ns in
mount_too_revealing() is repeated, up to three times, and could be computed
once and passed to mnt_already_visible().
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -6582,6 +6582,7 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns,
> const struct super_block *sb,
> int *new_mnt_flags)
> {
> + bool foreign_ns = !ns_capable_noaudit(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> int new_flags = *new_mnt_flags;
> struct mount *mnt;
[ ... ]
> @@ -6650,13 +6656,18 @@ static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags
> struct mnt_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns;
> unsigned long s_iflags;
>
> - if (ns->user_ns == &init_user_ns)
> - return false;
> -
> /* Can this filesystem be too revealing? */
> if (!(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_MOUNT_RESTRICTED))
> return false;
>
> + if (ns->user_ns == &init_user_ns &&
> + ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + return false;
> +
> + if (!ns_capable_noaudit(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
> + current_chrooted())
> + return true;
> +
This isn't a bug, but could the CAP_SYS_ADMIN-over-ns->user_ns result be
computed once in mount_too_revealing() and passed to mnt_already_visible(),
rather than calling ns_capable_noaudit(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) again for
foreign_ns?
When ns->user_ns is &init_user_ns, the first check here is the same test as
the second, and mnt_already_visible() evaluates it a third time.
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/44972669664