Re: [PATCH] vhost/net: bound the count of VHOST_SET_FEATURES_ARRAY
From: Hengyu Liang
Date: Sun Nov 22 2026 - 09:38:48 EST
On Sun, Nov 22, 2026 at 09:25:37AM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> this is followed by:
>
> virtio_features_zero(all_features);
> argp += sizeof(u64);
> copied = min(count, (u64)VIRTIO_FEATURES_U64S);
> if (copy_from_user(all_features, argp, copied * sizeof(u64)))
> return -EFAULT;
>
> copies at most 8 bytes.
>
>
> did you test that this patch actually helps anything?
That first copy is bounded, yes. The unbounded part is the loop right
after it, which is outside the diff context:
for (i = copied; i < count; ++i) {
if (copy_from_user(&features, featurep + 1 + i,
sizeof(features)))
return -EFAULT;
if (features)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
It reads one u64 per iteration up to the count from user space. With
count = U64_MAX and a large zero-filled mapping, it only stops at the
first unreadable address.
Yes, I tested it, on the vhost tree at 44293796526f (KASAN + lockdep),
count = U64_MAX:
1 GiB zero-filled mapping:
without the patch: EFAULT after 27.4 s
with the patch: E2BIG at once
2 GiB mapping, SIGKILL sent 1 s into the ioctl:
without the patch: the process is reaped 46.7 s after the kill
with the patch: the ioctl has already returned
I have a small reproducer (a few lines of C). Since I found this with
the help of an LLM, Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst asks me to
treat it as public and not post the reproducer to a public list, so I
have not included it here. I am happy to send it to you off-list if it
would help.
Thanks,
Hengyu