Re: /dev/random and /dev/psaux: too much entropy assumed?

C. Scott Ananian (cananian@lesser-magoo.lcs.mit.edu)
Tue, 1 Jun 1999 15:27:33 -0400 (EDT)


On 1 Jun 1999, Florian Weimer wrote:

> I would certainly like to end the thread after this, but I've got one
> further question: The implementation of /dev/random assumes that the
> output of the SHA-1 hash function is random for random (or almost random)
> input. Neither the people on sci.crypt nor I know of any analysis
> of SHA-1 in this direction (which doesn't prove anything of course).
> Are there any particular reasons why SHA-1 was chosen to supersede MD5?
> (It might indeed become practical to find collisions for MD5 soon,
> but this doesn't mean that MD5 is not suitable for applications like
> /dev/random.)

Patent issues, I strongly suspect. And most of the applications for
/dev/random don't actually require 'uniformly distributed' output (which
is my guess as to what you mean by 'random'); rather they require
'unguessable' output. SHA-1, being a strong one-way function, provides
unguessable output.
--s
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