Re: Non-Exec stack patches

[David Mosberger]

>>>>> On Wed, 24 Mar 2004 02:28:40 -0500, Jakub Jelinek <jakub@xxxxxxxxxx> said:

  Jakub> On Tue, Mar 23, 2004 at 11:16:36PM -0800, David Mosberger
  Jakub> wrote:

  >> I'm not following you on the "get ld.so handling free" part.  How
  >> is that handling free?

  Jakub> What I meant is that it is already written and tested.

OK.  The ELF flags bit is even more free, then... ;-)

  >> Actually, that's something that worries me.  Somebody just needs
  >> to succeed in loading any shared object with the right
  >> PT_GNU_STACK header and then the entire program will be exposed
  >> to the risk of a writable stack.  On ia64, I just don't see any
  >> need to ever implicitly turn on execute-permission on the stack,
  >> so why allow this extra backdoor?

  Jakub> What kind of backdoor is it?  If you dlopen untrusted shared
  Jakub> libraries into your program you have far bigger problem than
  Jakub> executable stack (you can execute any code it wants in its
  Jakub> constructors).

Sure.  Theoretically, none of this matters at all (thanks to
mprotect()), so we're justs talking about raising the barrier.  With
PT_GNU_STACK, it's sufficient to tweak one bit in any dependent
library, whereas with the ELF flag bit, you need to tweak one bit in
the main executable.  Not a huge difference, I'll submit, but from an
admin perspective, I find it a lot easier to check the main program to
see if it has the "executable stack/data" bit set rather than all
dependent libraries.  Additionally, we could easily choose to drop
support for the ELF flag bit altogether.  The only program that I know
of that ever needed executable data was XFree86 and that was only due
to an oversight---and that has long been fixed.

  Jakub> If there is a shared library which needs executable stack for
  Jakub> its use (on !IA64 !PPC64 this is e.g. any library which takes
  Jakub> address of a nested function and passes it to some other
  Jakub> function and/or stores it into some variable which cannot be
  Jakub> optimized out, on IA64 or PPC64 this is of course much rarer,

For sufficiently small values of "much rarer", I agree. ;-)

  Jakub> but it is still possible some language interpreter or
  Jakub> something builds code on the fly on the stack).

That's why there is mprotect().

	--david
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