Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs: introduce sendfd() syscall
From: Alex Dubov
Date: Tue Dec 02 2014 - 11:23:13 EST
On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 2:33 AM, Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, 2014-12-03 at 01:47 +1100, Alex Dubov wrote:
>> > User A can send fd(s) to processes belonging to user B, even if user B
>> > does (probably) not want this to happen ?
>> 1. Process A must have sufficient permissions to signal process B.
>> This will only happen if process A belongs to the same user as process
>> B or has elevated capabilities, which can not appear by themselves
>> (and if root on some machine can not be trusted, then all is lost
> I do not see this enforced in your patch.
> Allowing a process to hold many times the lock protecting my file
> descriptor table is very scary.
> Reserving a slot, then undo this if the signal failed is a nice way to
> slow down critical programs and eventually block them from doing
> progress when using file descriptors (most system calls afaik)
Yes, this is an omission. I already promised to tighten the security
in my last post. :)
>> 2. If process B has not specified explicitly how it wants the
>> particular signal to be handled, it will be killed by the default
>> handler. End of story, nothing else is going to happen.
> So it seems possible for an arbitrary program to send fds to innocent
> programs, that will likely fill their fd table and wont be able to open
> a new file.
> This opens interesting security issues and attack vectors.
Same as SIGKILL. And yet, our machines are still working fine.
If process A has sufficient capability to send signals to process B,
then process B is already at its mercy, fds or not fds.
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/