Re: [PATCH v4 3/7] fs: Verify access of user towards block device file when mounting
From: Seth Forshee
Date: Fri Sep 25 2015 - 13:39:54 EST
On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 12:16:59PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Argh. This looks like morning person meets night owl.
> Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> > On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 04:53:11PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> >> > When mounting a filesystem on a block device there is currently
> >> > no verification that the user has appropriate access to the
> >> > device file passed to mount. This has not been an issue so far
> >> > since the user in question has always been root, but this must
> >> > be changed before allowing unprivileged users to mount in user
> >> > namespaces.
> >> >
> >> > To do this, a new version of lookup_bdev() is added named
> >> > lookup_bdev_perm(). Both of these functions become wrappers
> >> > around a common inner fucntion. The behavior of lookup_bdev() is
> >> > unchanged, but calling lookup_bdev_perm() will fail if the user
> >> > does not have the specified access rights to the supplied path.
> >> > The permission check is skipped if the user has CAP_SYS_ADMIN to
> >> > avoid any possible regressions in behavior.
> >> >
> >> > blkdev_get_by_path() is updated to use lookup_bdev_perm(). This
> >> > is used by mount_bdev() and mount_mtd(), so this will cause
> >> > mounts on block devices to fail when the user lacks the required
> >> > permissions. Other calls to blkdev_get_by_path() will all happen
> >> > with root privileges, so these calls will be unaffected.
> >> Good but buggy patch.
> >> In the mtd bits the flags are super flags, not file mode bits,
> >> which makes testing them against FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE is
> >> incorrect.
> > Bah, yes. Fixed.
> >> Further it looks like quite a few more possibly all of the lookup_bdev
> >> instances could use inode level permission checking.
> >> Certainly code such as quotactl makes me wonder.
> > I opted to stick to places related to mounting, but let's take a look at
> > the other callers.
> > bcache calls it in the context of sysfs writes, and those attributes are
> > writable only by root. In that case the inode permission check will be
> > skipped anyway, so it makes no difference either way.
> > Device mapper calls it in dm_get_device, which is called from a bunch of
> > places. I had started trying to walk back through all the callers of
> > dm_get_device, but that rabbit hole got really deep really quickly so I
> > didn't feel confident that changing it wouldn't break anyone.
> > quotactl gave me pause, as it seems to have done for you too. I was
> > surprised that inode permissions aren't checked, but
> > check_quotactl_permission does get called before actually doing
> > anything. I fear that adding a check of inode permissions could end up
> > breaking someone.
> My gut feel on all of this is that we should act like may_open and have
> have a flag of 0 for access mode mean don't check permissions.
> That way we can change all of the callers of lookup_bdev to pass an
> additional argument and make it explicit what is going on but we don't
> actually have to change the callers to actually perform an additional
Sounds reasonable, I'll make that change.
> Leaving stones unturned is a good way to introduce a security hole by
> accident so I don't want to leave dm_get_device unreviewed, but any
> changes can be in later patches.
Unless I've made a mistake it shouldn't introduce security holes,
dm_get_device should behave exactly the same was as it behaves today.
Any security problems would already be present.
I can take another crack at reviewing, but it might also be good if
someone who already knows the code commented as well. As I recall I gave
up after getting several levels deep in indirect function calls where the
names of the struct members which held the function pointers were
identical at a couple of levels, so I was having a hard time knowing if
I was keeping everything straight.
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