On Fri, 13 Dec 1996, Thomas Koenig wrote:
> The Deviant wrote:
>
> >If you don't want your machine to be hacked, and you're willing to
> >sacrafice functionality, don't network it.
>
> There is also the possibility of a malicious user on a non-networked
> system.
>
> >> Some programs use mktemp(3). The filenames generated are predictable.
> >> Soft links are one way of exploiting this; hard links are another.
> >
> >Then mktemp(3) needs to be fixed...
>
> Can't do this, without breaking existing programs.
Name one.
>
> >A concept which I am all for. But
> >again, this is userland, not kernel.
>
> In that case, please provide a safe way that I can open a file in /tmp,
> without being root. Please include foolproof checks for symbolic and
> hard links.
The only actual problem that you've stated is the predictability of
mktemp(3)'s filenames. If you have a good reason why that can't be fixed
in the library, please, let me know. Again, this isn't a kernel problem.
At most its a problem in libc().
--Deviant
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The best way to accelerate a Macintoy is at 9.8 meters per second per second.
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