Re: [PATCH v10 07/37] mm: thread user_addr through page allocator for cache-friendly zeroing

[Michael S. Tsirkin]

On Mon, Jun 08, 2026 at 03:44:29PM +0100, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 08, 2026 at 04:37:03PM +0200, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
> > On 6/8/26 16:31, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > > On Mon, Jun 08, 2026 at 04:26:18PM +0200, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
> > >> If that means that we would handle __GFP_ZERO consistently in the callers of
> > >> alloc_frozen_pages(), that would also do I guess. We'd still have to pass the
> > >> user address down to some degree, through folio interfaces only at least.
> > > 
> > > What I don't understand is how the kernel page allocator needs to know
> > > the user address in order to effectively zero it, but the hypervisor is
> > > able to zero the page without knowing the user address.  It feels like
> > > somebody has x86-centric thinking where cache colouring doesn't matter.
> > 
> > (not commenting on the icache dache mess we have to drag along)
> 
> Well, that was kind of the point of this email ... I did ask the
> question you're answering in a different email so let me respond
> to that too.
> 
> > The thing is that with free-page-reporting the memory is already zeroed by the
> > hypervisor as part of discarding that memory previously (e.g., MADV_DONTNEED)
> > and allocating fresh pages on re-access.
> > 
> > So it's not a question of "why is the hypervisor zeroing less efficiently", as
> > zeroing is just a side-product of reclaiming that memory in the first place.
> 
> We definitely have users who don't want the guest to trust the
> hypervisor.  So how do they disable this optimisation?

What do you mean, how? This is done by:

[PATCH v10 35/37] virtio_balloon: disable reporting zeroed optimization for confidential guests


-- 
MST