Re: [PATCH bpf v2 1/7] bpf, sockmap: reject overflowing copy + len in bpf_msg_push_data()

[Emil Tsalapatis]

On Thu Jun 11, 2026 at 8:34 AM EDT, Jiayuan Chen wrote:
> From: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> When the scatterlist ring is full or nearly full, bpf_msg_push_data()
> enters a copy fallback path and computes copy + len for the page
> allocation size. Since len comes from BPF with arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING
> and both are u32, a crafted len can wrap the sum to a small value,
> causing an undersized allocation followed by an out-of-bounds memcpy.
>
>  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed104089a402
>  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
>  Call Trace:
>   __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105)
>   bpf_msg_push_data (net/core/filter.c:2852 net/core/filter.c:2788)
>   bpf_prog_9ed8b5711920a7d7+0x2e/0x36
>   sk_psock_msg_verdict (net/core/skmsg.c:934)
>   tcp_bpf_sendmsg (net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:421 net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:584)
>   __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2206)
>   do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
>   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
>
> Add an overflow check before the allocation.

Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260424155913.A19FDC19425@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Fixes: 6fff607e2f14 ("bpf: sk_msg program helper bpf_msg_push_data")
> Tested-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@xxxxxxx>
> Tested-by: Xinyu Ma <mmmxny@xxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@xxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> To sashiko:
>
> Regarding bpf_msg_push_data() reading "copy = msg->sg.data[i].length" with
> i == msg->sg.end (appending at the very end of a full/near-full ring):
>
> This is pre-existing code, not touched by this series, and reproducing it needs
> a narrow combination -- a pure append at the end so the loop exits with
> i == msg->sg.end, a full/near-full ring, plus a prior push/pop history that
> leaves a stale length in the otherwise-unused end slot. A freshly built ring
> zeroes that slot, so copy stays 0. We don't consider it practically reproducible.
>
> Even then it's already covered: the overflow check in patch 1 ("copy + len <
> copy") rejects the dangerous case, and __GFP_ZERO in patch 3 prevents any data
> exposure. Not worth fixing here.
> ---
>  net/core/filter.c | 3 +++
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
> index 9590877b0714f..3c8f1cedb217f 100644
> --- a/net/core/filter.c
> +++ b/net/core/filter.c
> @@ -2829,6 +2829,9 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start,
>  	if (!space || (space == 1 && start != offset))
>  		copy = msg->sg.data[i].length;
>  
> +	if (unlikely(copy + len < copy))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
>  	page = alloc_pages(__GFP_NOWARN | GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_COMP,
>  			   get_order(copy + len));
>  	if (unlikely(!page))