Re: [PATCH v2] panic: allow force_cpu redirect from an NMI

From: Petr Mladek

Date: Mon Jul 13 2026 - 10:25:27 EST


On Wed 2026-07-08 16:43:12, Bradley Morgan wrote:
> nmi_panic() calls panic_try_start() before panic(), so it claims
> panic_cpu first. When the panic then reaches panic_try_force_cpu(),
> panic_in_progress() sees panic_cpu set and returns false, so the
> redirect to the requested CPU never happens. The crash kernel runs
> on the CPU that took the NMI instead.
>
> smp_call_function_single_async() is safe from NMI context,

Why do you think so, please?

I was not sure and asked about this in v1, see
https://lore.kernel.org/all/ak5GGf7ypVthkZk_@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
I haven't seen any answer or explanation.

The comment above smp_call_function_single_async() says that it
should be safe in IRQ context. It does not talk about NMI.

You might be right. But I would expect an explanation instead
of a simple claim.

> the redirect first. nmi_panic() now calls panic_try_force_cpu()
> before panic_try_start(), and only claims panic_cpu when no redirect
> is done. The requested CPU then claims panic_cpu itself.
>
> Also use panic_on_other_cpu() in place of the open coded check and
> return true to stop directly.

This is weird. This patch replaces panic_in_progress() with
panic_on_other_cpu() and the commit message should explain why.

The patch also shuffles the code formatting the panic message:

+ It should be described in the commit message.

+ It actually should be done in a separate patch. Because
mixing too many changes into a single patch complicates
the review and bisection of eventual regressions.

+ Most importantly, it can't be done because it is racy,
see below.


> diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
> index ebdc46af6aa9..b039bb6f1d19 100644
> --- a/kernel/panic.c
> +++ b/kernel/panic.c
> @@ -396,9 +393,9 @@ static bool panic_try_force_cpu(const char *fmt, va_list args)
> return false;
> }
>
> - /* Another panic already in progress */
> - if (panic_in_progress())
> - return false;
> + /* Stop this CPU when the panic is already proceeding elsewhere. */
> + if (panic_on_other_cpu())
> + return true;

How should we handle the case when the panic is on this CPU?
Could this happen?

We should not try to redirect panic() when "panic_cpu" is already
assigned.

We should always return when panic_in_progress(). But we should return
either true or false depending whether the panic is on another or this CPU.

> /*
> * Only one CPU can do the redirection. Others should go
> @@ -412,12 +409,7 @@ static bool panic_try_force_cpu(const char *fmt, va_list args)
> * fall back to static message for early boot panics or allocation failure.
> */
> if (panic_force_buf) {
> - va_list ap;
> -
> - /* Do not consume args, the caller reuses it if we fail */
> - va_copy(ap, args);
> - vsnprintf(panic_force_buf, PANIC_MSG_BUFSZ, fmt, ap);
> - va_end(ap);
> + strscpy(panic_force_buf, msg, PANIC_MSG_BUFSZ);

This removes a code added by another patch which is still in Andrew's
staging. A better solution would have been to ask Andrew to replace
the older patch with this one.

But we actually want to keep it to avoid the race, see below.

> msg = panic_force_buf;
> } else {
> msg = "Redirected panic (buffer unavailable)";
> @@ -515,7 +506,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_on_other_cpu);
> */
> void nmi_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *msg)
> {
> - if (panic_try_start())
> + if (panic_try_force_cpu(msg))
> + nmi_panic_self_stop(regs);
> + else if (panic_try_start())
> panic("%s", msg);
> else if (panic_on_other_cpu())
> nmi_panic_self_stop(regs);

This code is kind of a puzzle. It is partly because panic_try*() does
not explain well the meaning. And partly because the return
values from both panic_try*() functions have a different
meaning.

Also the repeated nmi_panic_self_stop() looks a bit ugly.

I think that we could do better. And we could use the fact
that panic() is a no return function.

I would suggest something like:

<proposal_1>
/* Try to redirect panic() to a requested CPU when set. */
if (panic_try_force_cpu(msg))
goto self_stop;

/* Try to acquire rights to proceed with (noreturn) panic(). */
if (panic_try_start())
panic("%s", msg);

if (panic_on_other_cpu())
goto self_stop;

/*
* This should never happen. This CPU either acquired "panic_cpu"
* or it has already been taken in which case panic_on_other_cpu()
* should return true.
*/
return;

self_stop:
nmi_panic_self_stop(regs);
</proposal_1>

IMHO, we actually could do:

<proposal_2>
/* Try to redirect panic() to a requested CPU when set. */
if (panic_try_force_cpu(msg))
goto self_stop;

/* Try to acquire rights to proceed with (noreturn) panic(). */
if (panic_try_start())
panic("%s", msg);

/*
* panic_try_start() might fail only when the panic() is
* already in progress on another CPU in which case
* this CPU should stop.
*/
self_stop:
nmi_panic_self_stop(regs);
</proposal_2>

It would be better to split this into two patches:

+ 1st patch would remove the original if else.
+ 2nd patch would add the panic_try_force_cpu(msg) + goto.


> @@ -609,8 +602,13 @@ void vpanic(const char *fmt, va_list args)
> local_irq_disable();
> preempt_disable_notrace();
>
> + /* Format the message once; reused for the log and any redirect IPI. */
> + len = vscnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
> + if (len && buf[len - 1] == '\n')
> + buf[len - 1] = '\0';

This is not safe. "buf" is defined as a static variable. It is _not_
on stack but it is a global variable. It can be used only by
the CPU which wins cmpxchg to "panic_cpu". IMHO, we need to keep
it as is.

> +
> /* Redirect panic to target CPU if configured via panic_force_cpu=. */
> - if (panic_try_force_cpu(fmt, args)) {
> + if (panic_try_force_cpu(buf)) {
> /*
> * Mark ourselves offline so panic_other_cpus_shutdown() won't wait
> * for us on architectures that check num_online_cpus().


More info:

This patch has been hard to review:

1. It did not apply because it depended on two other patches.
Only one of them was in Andrews' unstable tree.

=> It is better to send patchsets than single patches which
depend on each other.

=> Also it is better to wait until the discussion settles so
that you know which patches were taken and which not. [*]


2. The patch did many things together.

=> It is always better to split changes into more patches.


3. The commit message did not describe all the changes.

=> Double check everything before sending patches to
the mailing list.


[*] The problem was partly also because Andrew did take the patches
into the unstable tree so quickly.

Best Regards,
Petr