Re: [PATCH 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation

From: Mickaël Salaün

Date: Mon Nov 16 2026 - 08:27:07 EST


Thanks, applied!

I fixed some minor issues though, see
https://git.kernel.org/mic/c/57493c3b7f449a60d1c43322158671b98684f9b1

On Tue, Nov 10, 2026 at 09:24:34PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Some documented claims about LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE do not
> hold for every capability check. Remove them instead of listing their
> exceptions, and call it a permission instead of a hook.
>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 8 ++++----
> Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 8 ++++----
> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 6 +++---
> 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
> index d81f1c2cd236..98c2e7139e8d 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
> @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock LSM: kernel documentation
> ==================================
>
> :Author: Mickaël Salaün
> -:Date: October 2026
> +:Date: November 2026
>
> Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To
> harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process,
> @@ -359,9 +359,9 @@ framework in ``log.c``, compiled under ``CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG``
> (automatically selected by ``CONFIG_AUDIT`` or ``CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS``).
>
> Audit records respect audit configuration, the domain's Landlock log
> -flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``. Tracepoints fire unconditionally,
> -independent of these settings. The denial counter (``num_denials``) is
> -always incremented regardless of logging configuration.
> +flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``. Tracepoints fire independently of
> +these settings. The denial counter (``num_denials``) is
> +incremented regardless of logging configuration.
>
> Each denial tracepoint carries a ``logged`` field reporting the
> audit-logging verdict: whether the denial would be written to the audit
> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> index 3d45b956b640..d00e94d8ed37 100644
> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
> =====================================
>
> :Author: Mickaël Salaün
> -:Date: October 2026
> +:Date: November 2026
>
> The goal of Landlock is to enable restriction of ambient rights (e.g. global
> filesystem or network access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
> @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ acquisition via :manpage:`open_tree(2)` / :manpage:`fsmount(2)`. Namespaces
> the process is already a member of when the domain is enforced are implicitly
> allowed (the process could not continue running otherwise); rules describe
> which new namespace types the process may acquire.
> -``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates every exercise of a capability
> +``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates the exercise of capabilities
> after the domain is enforced, regardless
> of how the capability was obtained (inherited credentials, ``CLONE_NEWUSER``
> grant, ``setuid``/file-cap-bearing :manpage:`execve(2)`, etc.). Configuring
> @@ -641,9 +641,9 @@ after a domain is enforced through user namespace entry or :manpage:`capset(2)`;
> privileged sandboxes that did not set ``PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS`` may also gain
> capabilities through :manpage:`execve(2)` of binaries with file capabilities.
> In all cases, :manpage:`capget(2)` will report the credential's capability sets,
> -but any denied capability will fail with ``EPERM`` when exercised. Do not rely
> +but any denied capability will fail when exercised. Do not rely
> on :manpage:`capget(2)` to determine whether the policy permits a given
> -capability; only the actual operation will return ``EPERM`` upon denial.
> +capability.
>
> Truncating files
> ----------------
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> index 24510e5d8479..c9e4ce23778b 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> @@ -622,9 +622,9 @@ struct landlock_capability_attr {
> * - %LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE: Restrict the use of specific Linux
> * capabilities. A process in a Landlock domain that handles this permission
> * is denied from exercising capabilities that are not explicitly allowed by a
> - * %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule. This hook is purely restrictive: it can
> - * deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can never
> - * grant capabilities that the kernel already denied. Support added in
> + * %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule. This permission is purely restrictive: it
> + * can deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can
> + * never grant capabilities that the kernel already denied. Support added in
> * Landlock ABI version 12.
> */
> #define LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE (1ULL << 0)
> --
> 2.56.0
>
>