Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities
From: Günther Noack
Date: Tue Nov 17 2026 - 10:41:47 EST
On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:11:53AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> A process in a domain that denies CAP_SETPCAP could still add
> capabilities outside of its permitted set to its inheritable set with
> capset(2), if it held CAP_SETPCAP. cap_capset() checks CAP_SETPCAP with
> cap_capable() in cap_inh_is_capped(), so the check never reaches
> hook_capable(). Through file inheritable capabilities, such a set can
> grant new permitted capabilities on execve() when no_new_privs is not
> set, which is possible for a domain enforced by a task holding
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
>
> Add a Landlock capset hook that checks CAP_SETPCAP against the domain
> under the same condition as cap_capset(). As with the mmap_addr hook,
> LSMs implement their own policy in this hook: SELinux checks capset with
> its own permission.
>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>
> Changes since v1:
> https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202436.2408244-4-mic@xxxxxxxxxxx
> - Add Serge Hallyn's Acked-by.
> ---
> security/landlock/cap.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/landlock/cap.c b/security/landlock/cap.c
> index 10e1ca772b9c..c89e8d76db8c 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/cap.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/cap.c
> @@ -91,6 +91,35 @@ static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> return check_cap(cred, cap, opts);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * hook_capset - Restrict inheritable capability changes
> + *
> + * @new: New credentials (unused).
> + * @old: Current credentials.
> + * @effective: New effective set (unused).
> + * @inheritable: New inheritable set.
> + * @permitted: New permitted set (unused).
> + *
> + * cap_capset() requires CAP_SETPCAP to add inheritable capabilities that are
> + * not in the old permitted set, but calls cap_capable() directly, which skips
> + * hook_capable().
It has taken me a bit of time to wrap my head around this one.
cap_capset() starts with:
if (cap_inh_is_capped() &&
!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
old->cap_permitted)))
/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
return -EPERM;
where cap_inh_is_capped() returns true if it does *not* have CAP_SETPCAP.
So when this Landlock hooks gets called, cap_capset() has already
checked that we either have CAP_SETPCAP or inheritable ⊆
(old->inheritable ⋃ old->permitted). So the Landlock hook can check
for the cap_issubset(...) condition to see whether CAP_SETPCAP had to
be "used".
Maybe it would be easier to phrase it like that?
(A more specific nit about this comment, "calls cap_capable()
*directly*" has confused me a bit, since cap_capset() calls
cap_capable() only *indirectly* through cap_inh_is_capped(). Maybe
"promptly", or "immediately" would be better?)
> Check the same condition against the domain. commoncap runs
> + * first, so this only sees requests that commoncap allowed. capset(2) discards
> + * @new if this hook fails, so nothing is committed.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if CAP_SETPCAP use is denied.
> + */
> +static int hook_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> + const kernel_cap_t *effective,
> + const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
> + const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
> +{
> + if (cap_issubset(*inheritable,
> + cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, old->cap_permitted)))
> + return 0;
> +
> + return check_cap(old, CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * hook_mmap_addr - Restrict mappings below dac_mmap_min_addr
> *
> @@ -113,6 +142,7 @@ static int hook_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
>
> static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, hook_capable),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, hook_capset),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, hook_mmap_addr),
> };
>
> --
> 2.56.0
>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@xxxxxxxxxx>
Code checks out, only minor comments about the documentation. It has
taken me a bit to understand how the Landlock hook's logic matches the
one in cap_capset().
—Günther