Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities

From: Mickaël Salaün

Date: Wed Nov 18 2026 - 12:01:39 EST


On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 04:41:35PM +0100, Günther Noack wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:11:53AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > A process in a domain that denies CAP_SETPCAP could still add
> > capabilities outside of its permitted set to its inheritable set with
> > capset(2), if it held CAP_SETPCAP. cap_capset() checks CAP_SETPCAP with
> > cap_capable() in cap_inh_is_capped(), so the check never reaches
> > hook_capable(). Through file inheritable capabilities, such a set can
> > grant new permitted capabilities on execve() when no_new_privs is not
> > set, which is possible for a domain enforced by a task holding
> > CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> >
> > Add a Landlock capset hook that checks CAP_SETPCAP against the domain
> > under the same condition as cap_capset(). As with the mmap_addr hook,
> > LSMs implement their own policy in this hook: SELinux checks capset with
> > its own permission.
> >
> > Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >
> > Changes since v1:
> > https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202436.2408244-4-mic@xxxxxxxxxxx
> > - Add Serge Hallyn's Acked-by.
> > ---
> > security/landlock/cap.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/landlock/cap.c b/security/landlock/cap.c
> > index 10e1ca772b9c..c89e8d76db8c 100644
> > --- a/security/landlock/cap.c
> > +++ b/security/landlock/cap.c
> > @@ -91,6 +91,35 @@ static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> > return check_cap(cred, cap, opts);
> > }
> >
> > +/**
> > + * hook_capset - Restrict inheritable capability changes
> > + *
> > + * @new: New credentials (unused).
> > + * @old: Current credentials.
> > + * @effective: New effective set (unused).
> > + * @inheritable: New inheritable set.
> > + * @permitted: New permitted set (unused).
> > + *
> > + * cap_capset() requires CAP_SETPCAP to add inheritable capabilities that are
> > + * not in the old permitted set, but calls cap_capable() directly, which skips
> > + * hook_capable().
>
> It has taken me a bit of time to wrap my head around this one.
>
> cap_capset() starts with:
>
> if (cap_inh_is_capped() &&
> !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
> cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
> old->cap_permitted)))
> /* incapable of using this inheritable set */
> return -EPERM;
>
> where cap_inh_is_capped() returns true if it does *not* have CAP_SETPCAP.
>
> So when this Landlock hooks gets called, cap_capset() has already
> checked that we either have CAP_SETPCAP or inheritable ⊆
> (old->inheritable ⋃ old->permitted). So the Landlock hook can check
> for the cap_issubset(...) condition to see whether CAP_SETPCAP had to
> be "used".
>
> Maybe it would be easier to phrase it like that?
>
>
> (A more specific nit about this comment, "calls cap_capable()
> *directly*" has confused me a bit, since cap_capset() calls
> cap_capable() only *indirectly* through cap_inh_is_capped(). Maybe
> "promptly", or "immediately" would be better?)

I agree, the v3 should address your concerns.

>
> > Check the same condition against the domain. commoncap runs
> > + * first, so this only sees requests that commoncap allowed. capset(2) discards
> > + * @new if this hook fails, so nothing is committed.
> > + *
> > + * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if CAP_SETPCAP use is denied.
> > + */
> > +static int hook_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> > + const kernel_cap_t *effective,
> > + const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
> > + const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
> > +{
> > + if (cap_issubset(*inheritable,
> > + cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, old->cap_permitted)))
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + return check_cap(old, CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE);
> > +}
> > +
> > /**
> > * hook_mmap_addr - Restrict mappings below dac_mmap_min_addr
> > *
> > @@ -113,6 +142,7 @@ static int hook_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
> >
> > static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, hook_capable),
> > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, hook_capset),
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, hook_mmap_addr),
> > };
> >
> > --
> > 2.56.0
> >
>
> Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Code checks out, only minor comments about the documentation. It has
> taken me a bit to understand how the Landlock hook's logic matches the
> one in cap_capset().
>
> —Günther