[PATCH 2/2] file capabilities: honor !SECURE_NOROOT

[Serge E. Hallyn]

From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@xxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] file capabilities: honor !SECURE_NOROOT

When the SECURE_NOROOT securebit is not set, allow root to
keep it's capabilities over exec, rather than compute the
capabilities based on file capabilities.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 security/commoncap.c |    6 +++++-
 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index fde9695..be86acb 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -202,12 +202,16 @@ #endif
 
 int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
+	int ret;
+
 	/* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
 
 	cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
 	cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
 	cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
 
+	ret = set_file_caps(bprm);
+
 	/*  To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
 	 *  executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
 	 *  capability sets for the file.
@@ -225,7 +229,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_
 			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
 	}
 
-	return set_file_caps(bprm);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
-- 
1.4.1

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