Re: [PATCH 2/2] net: Implement SO_PASSCGROUP to enable passing cgroup path

[Vivek Goyal]

On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 09:55:08AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 9:48 AM, Simo Sorce <ssorce@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Thu, 2014-04-17 at 09:37 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 9:24 AM, Simo Sorce <ssorce@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> > On Thu, 2014-04-17 at 09:11 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> No.  The logging daemon thinks it wants to know who the writer is, but
> >> >> the logging daemon is wrong.  It actually wants to know who composed a
> >> >> log message destined to it.  The caller of write(2) may or may not be
> >> >> the same entity.
> >> >
> >> > This works both ways, and doesn't really matter, you are *no* better off
> >> > w/o this interface.
> >> >
> >> >> If this form of SO_PASSCGROUP somehow makes it into a pull request for
> >> >> Linus, I will ask him not to pull it and/or to revert it.  I think
> >> >> he'll agree that write(2) MUST NOT care who called it.
> >> >
> >> > And write() does not, there is no access control check being performed
> >> > here. This call is the same as getting the pid of the process and
> >> > crawling /proc with that information, just more efficient and race-free.
> >>
> >> Doing it using the pid of writer is wrong.  So is doing it with the
> >> cgroup of the writer.  The fact that it's even possible to use the pid
> >> of the caller of write(2) is a mistake, but that particular mistake
> >> is, unfortunately, well-enshrined in history.
> >>
> >> >
> >> > I repeat, it is *not* access control.
> >> >
> >>
> >> Sure it is.
> >>
> >> Either correct attribution of logs doesn't matter, in which case it
> >> makes little difference how you do it, or it does matter, in which
> >> case it should be done right.
> >
> > Well journald can *also* get  SO_PEERCGROUP and log anomalies if the 2
> > differ. That is if the log happens on a connected socket.
> >
> > If the log happens on a unix datagram* then SO_PEERCGROUP is not
> > available because there is no connect(), however write() cannot be used
> > either, only sendmsg() AFAIK, so the "setuid" binary attack does not
> > apply.
> >
> 
> Or you could only send SCM_CGROUP when the writer asks sendmsg to send
> it, in which case this whole problem goes away.

Sending SCM_CGROUP explicitly is also sending cgroup info at write(2) time
and if receiver uses that info for access control, it can be problematic.

Thanks
Vivek
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/