[PATCH 3.2 001/152] eCryptfs: Force RO mount when encrypted view is enabled

[Ben Hutchings]

3.2.67-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 332b122d39c9cbff8b799007a825d94b2e7c12f2 upstream.

The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option greatly changes the
functionality of an eCryptfs mount. Instead of encrypting and decrypting
lower files, it provides a unified view of the encrypted files in the
lower filesystem. The presence of the ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount
option is intended to force a read-only mount and modifying files is not
supported when the feature is in use. See the following commit for more
information:

  e77a56d [PATCH] eCryptfs: Encrypted passthrough

This patch forces the mount to be read-only when the
ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified by setting the
MS_RDONLY flag on the superblock. Additionally, this patch removes some
broken logic in ecryptfs_open() that attempted to prevent modifications
of files when the encrypted view feature was in use. The check in
ecryptfs_open() was not sufficient to prevent file modifications using
system calls that do not operate on a file descriptor.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Priya Bansal <p.bansal@xxxxxxxxxxx>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 fs/ecryptfs/file.c | 12 ------------
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
@@ -196,24 +196,12 @@ static int ecryptfs_open(struct inode *i
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat = NULL;
-	struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
 	struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	/* Private value of ecryptfs_dentry allocated in
 	 * ecryptfs_lookup() */
 	struct dentry *lower_dentry;
 	struct ecryptfs_file_info *file_info;
 
-	mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
-		ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
-	if ((mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED)
-	    && ((file->f_flags & O_WRONLY) || (file->f_flags & O_RDWR)
-		|| (file->f_flags & O_CREAT) || (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)
-		|| (file->f_flags & O_APPEND))) {
-		printk(KERN_WARNING "Mount has encrypted view enabled; "
-		       "files may only be read\n");
-		rc = -EPERM;
-		goto out;
-	}
 	/* Released in ecryptfs_release or end of function if failure */
 	file_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_file_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
 	ecryptfs_set_file_private(file, file_info);
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
@@ -494,6 +494,7 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(str
 {
 	struct super_block *s;
 	struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi;
+	struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
 	struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *root_info;
 	const char *err = "Getting sb failed";
 	struct inode *inode;
@@ -512,6 +513,7 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(str
 		err = "Error parsing options";
 		goto out;
 	}
+	mount_crypt_stat = &sbi->mount_crypt_stat;
 
 	s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(s)) {
@@ -557,11 +559,19 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(str
 
 	/**
 	 * Set the POSIX ACL flag based on whether they're enabled in the lower
-	 * mount. Force a read-only eCryptfs mount if the lower mount is ro.
-	 * Allow a ro eCryptfs mount even when the lower mount is rw.
+	 * mount.
 	 */
 	s->s_flags = flags & ~MS_POSIXACL;
-	s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & (MS_RDONLY | MS_POSIXACL);
+	s->s_flags |= path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_POSIXACL;
+
+	/**
+	 * Force a read-only eCryptfs mount when:
+	 *   1) The lower mount is ro
+	 *   2) The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified
+	 */
+	if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY ||
+	    mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED)
+		s->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
 
 	s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
 	s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;

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