Re: [BUG/PATCH] kernel RNG and its secrets

[mancha]

On Wed, Mar 18, 2015 at 01:02:12PM +0100, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 18, 2015, at 12:09, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > Am Mittwoch, 18. MÃrz 2015, 11:56:43 schrieb Daniel Borkmann:
> > >On 03/18/2015 11:50 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> > >> On Wed, Mar 18, 2015, at 10:53, mancha wrote:
> > >>> Hi.
> > >>> 
> > >>> The kernel RNG introduced memzero_explicit in d4c5efdb9777 to
> > >>> protect
> > >>> 
> > >>> memory cleansing against things like dead store optimization:
> > >>>     void memzero_explicit(void *s, size_t count)
> > >>>     {
> > >>>     
> > >>>             memset(s, 0, count);
> > >>>             OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(s);
> > >>>     
> > >>>     }
> > >>> 
> > >>> OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR, introduced in fe8c8a126806 to protect
> > >>> crypto_memneq>> 
> > >>> against timing analysis, is defined when using gcc as:
> > >>>     #define OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(var) __asm__ ("" : "=r" (var) : "0"
> > >>>     (var))
> > >>> 
> > >>> My tests with gcc 4.8.2 on x86 find it insufficient to prevent gcc
> > >>> from optimizing out memset (i.e. secrets remain in memory).
> > >>> 
> > >>> Two things that do work:
> > >>>     __asm__ __volatile__ ("" : "=r" (var) : "0" (var))
> > >> 
> > >> You are correct, volatile signature should be added to
> > >> OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR. Because we use an output variable "=r", gcc is
> > >> allowed to check if it is needed and may remove the asm statement.
> > >> Another option would be to just use var as an input variable - asm
> > >> blocks without output variables are always considered being volatile
> > >> by gcc.
> > >> 
> > >> Can you send a patch?
> > >> 
> > >> I don't think it is security critical, as Daniel pointed out, the
> > >> call
> > >> will happen because the function is an external call to the crypto
> > >> functions, thus the compiler has to flush memory on return.
> > >
> > >Just had a look.
> > >
> > >$ gdb vmlinux
> > >(gdb) disassemble memzero_explicit
> > >Dump of assembler code for function memzero_explicit:
> > >    0xffffffff813a18b0 <+0>:	push   %rbp
> > >    0xffffffff813a18b1 <+1>:	mov    %rsi,%rdx
> > >    0xffffffff813a18b4 <+4>:	xor    %esi,%esi
> > >    0xffffffff813a18b6 <+6>:	mov    %rsp,%rbp
> > >    0xffffffff813a18b9 <+9>:	callq  0xffffffff813a7120 <memset>
> > >    0xffffffff813a18be <+14>:	pop    %rbp
> > >    0xffffffff813a18bf <+15>:	retq
> > >End of assembler dump.
> > >
> > >(gdb) disassemble extract_entropy
> > >[...]
> > >    0xffffffff814a5000 <+304>:	sub    %r15,%rbx
> > >    0xffffffff814a5003 <+307>:	jne    0xffffffff814a4f80
> > ><extract_entropy+176> 0xffffffff814a5009 <+313>:	mov    %r12,%rdi
> > >    0xffffffff814a500c <+316>:	mov    $0xa,%esi
> > >    0xffffffff814a5011 <+321>:	callq  0xffffffff813a18b0
> > ><memzero_explicit> 0xffffffff814a5016 <+326>:	mov    -0x48(%rbp),%rax
> > >[...]
> > >
> > >I would be fine with __volatile__.
> > 
> > Are we sure that simply adding a __volatile__ works in any case? I just 
> > did a test with a simple user space app:
> > 
> > static inline void memset_secure(void *s, int c, size_t n)
> > {
> >         memset(s, c, n);
> >         //__asm__ __volatile__("": : :"memory");
> >         __asm__ __volatile__("" : "=r" (s) : "0" (s));
> > }
> > 
> 
> Good point, thanks!
> 
> Of course an input or output of s does not force the memory pointed to
> by s being flushed.
> 
> 
> My proposal would be to add a
> 
> #define OPTIMIZER_HIDE_MEM(ptr, len) __asm__ __volatile__ ("" : : "m"(
> ({ struct { u8 b[len]; } *p = (void *)ptr ; *p; }) )
> 
> and use this in the code function.
> 
> This is documented in gcc manual 6.43.2.5.
> 
> Bye,
> Hannes
> 

Hi all.

Any reason to not use __asm__ __volatile__("": : :"memory") [aka 
barrier()]?

Or maybe __asm__ __volatile__("": :"r"(ptr) :"memory").

Cheers.

--mancha

Attachment: pgp4zgvtyGepp.pgp
Description: PGP signature