Re: [PATCH v2 04/11] uprobes: Change prepare_uretprobe() to use uprobe_warn()

From: Anton Arapov
Date: Tue Jul 07 2015 - 08:52:42 EST


On Tue, Jul 07, 2015 at 03:22:47AM +0200, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> Turn the last pr_warn() in uprobes.c into uprobe_warn().
>
> While at it:
>
> - s/kzalloc/kmalloc, we initialize every member of ri
>
> - remove the pointless comment above the obvious code
>
> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Acked-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Anton Arapov <arapov@xxxxxxxxx>

> ---
> kernel/events/uprobes.c | 10 +++-------
> 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
> index eabdc21..4c941fe 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
> @@ -1541,9 +1541,9 @@ static void prepare_uretprobe(struct uprobe *uprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
> return;
> }
>
> - ri = kzalloc(sizeof(struct return_instance), GFP_KERNEL);
> + ri = kmalloc(sizeof(struct return_instance), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!ri)
> - goto fail;
> + return;
>
> trampoline_vaddr = get_trampoline_vaddr();
> orig_ret_vaddr = arch_uretprobe_hijack_return_addr(trampoline_vaddr, regs);
> @@ -1561,8 +1561,7 @@ static void prepare_uretprobe(struct uprobe *uprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
> * This situation is not possible. Likely we have an
> * attack from user-space.
> */
> - pr_warn("uprobe: unable to set uretprobe pid/tgid=%d/%d\n",
> - current->pid, current->tgid);
> + uprobe_warn(current, "handle tail call");
> goto fail;
> }
>
> @@ -1576,13 +1575,10 @@ static void prepare_uretprobe(struct uprobe *uprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
> ri->chained = chained;
>
> utask->depth++;
> -
> - /* add instance to the stack */
> ri->next = utask->return_instances;
> utask->return_instances = ri;
>
> return;
> -
> fail:
> kfree(ri);
> }
> --
> 1.5.5.1
>
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