Re: Potential data race in uart_ioctl

[Peter Hurley]

On 08/25/2015 02:38 PM, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 25, 2015 at 8:32 PM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Tue, Aug 25, 2015 at 8:26 PM, Peter Hurley <peter@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On 08/25/2015 08:17 AM, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
>>>> Hi!
>>>>
>>>> We are working on a dynamic data race detector for the Linux kernel
>>>> called KernelThreadSanitizer (ktsan)
>>>> (https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki).
>>>>
>>>> While booting the kernel (upstream revision 21bdb584af8c) we got a report:
>>>>
>>>> ==================================================================
>>>> ThreadSanitizer: data-race in uart_ioctl
>>>>
>>>> Read of size 8 by thread T424 (K971):
>>>>  [<ffffffff81673c56>] uart_ioctl+0x36/0x11e0
>>>> drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:1216
>>>>  [<ffffffff81643802>] tty_ioctl+0x4f2/0x11d0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2924
>>>>  [<     inlined    >] do_vfs_ioctl+0x44a/0x750 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
>>>>  [<ffffffff8127b0ca>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x44a/0x750 fs/ioctl.c:607
>>>>  [<     inlined    >] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0xa0 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:622
>>>>  [<ffffffff8127b449>] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0xa0 fs/ioctl.c:613
>>>>  [<ffffffff81eae0ae>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71
>>>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:186
>>>> DBG: cpu = ffff88063fc1fe68
>>>> DBG: cpu id = 0
>>>>
>>>> Previous write of size 8 by thread T422 (K970):
>>>>  [<ffffffff816737ef>] uart_open+0x12f/0x220
>>>> drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:1629
>>>>  [<ffffffff81645be2>] tty_open+0x192/0x8f0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2105
>>>>  [<ffffffff812628fc>] chrdev_open+0x13c/0x290 fs/char_dev.c:388
>>>>  [<ffffffff812582fc>] do_dentry_open+0x3ac/0x550 fs/open.c:736
>>>>  [<ffffffff81259d68>] vfs_open+0xb8/0xe0 fs/open.c:853
>>>>  [<     inlined    >] path_openat+0x81c/0x2440 do_last fs/namei.c:3163
>>>>  [<ffffffff81272f1c>] path_openat+0x81c/0x2440 fs/namei.c:3295
>>>>  [<ffffffff8127656a>] do_filp_open+0xfa/0x170 fs/namei.c:3330
>>>>  [<ffffffff8125a243>] do_sys_open+0x183/0x2b0 fs/open.c:1025
>>>>  [<     inlined    >] SyS_open+0x35/0x50 SYSC_open fs/open.c:1043
>>>>  [<ffffffff8125a3a5>] SyS_open+0x35/0x50 fs/open.c:1038
>>>>  [<ffffffff81eae0ae>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71
>>>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:186
>>>> DBG: cpu = ffff88063fd1fe68
>>>>
>>>> DBG: addr: ffff8801d2a0ce88
>>>> DBG: first offset: 0, second offset: 0
>>>> DBG: T424 clock: {T424: 211057, T422: 275728}
>>>> DBG: T422 clock: {T422: 275819}
>>>> ==================================================================
>>>>
>>>> It seems that one thread reads and uses tty->driver_data while it's
>>>> being initialized in another one. The second thread holds port->mutex,
>>>> but the first one does a few accesses to tty->driver_data before
>>>> locking it.
>>>>
>>>> Could you confirm if this is a real race?
>>>
>>> Although I don't understand what triggers ktsan to signal a race
>>> condition, this doesn't appear to be an actual race.
>>>
>>> For an ioctl() syscall to act on any given tty requires a successful
>>> open() syscall to have nearly completed (do_sys_open() => fd_install()
>>> initializes the file descriptor; ioctl() => fdget() derefs the descriptor).
>>>
>>> Perhaps what's tripping the race detection is that 2nd and subsequent
>>> opens also (redundantly) write the same values as from the first open?
>>
>> Since we use a fuzzer, yes, it is possible that open is called twice.
> 
> Oh, no, sorry, this happens during booting.
> The race is on tty_struct, which is probably shared between several
> file descriptors.

Yep, but there is 1:1 correspondence between tty_struct and uart_state;
so once the first open() initializes tty->driver_data, subsequent opens
are just re-writing the same value for tty->driver_data.

Is ktsan just triggering on the fact there is a memory write, without
checking the value has changed?

Regards,
Peter Hurley

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