Re: [REVIEW][PATCH] exec: Don't exec files the userns root can not read.
From: Jann Horn
Date: Wed Oct 19 2016 - 13:29:28 EST
On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 11:52:50AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> > Simply ptrace yourself, exec the
> > program, and then dump the program out. A program that really wants
> > to be unreadable should have a stub: the stub is setuid and readable,
> > but all the stub does is to exec the real program, and the real
> > program should have mode 0500 or similar.
> > ISTM the "right" check would be to enforce that the program's new
> > creds can read the program, but that will break backwards
> > compatibility.
> Last I looked I had the impression that exec of a setuid program kills
> the ptrace.
> If we are talking about a exec of a simple unreadable executable (aka
> something that sets undumpable but is not setuid or setgid). Then I
> agree it should break the ptrace as well and since those programs are as
> rare as hens teeth I don't see any problem with changing the ptrace behavior
> in that case.
Nope. check_unsafe_exec() sets LSM_UNSAFE_* flags in bprm->unsafe, and then
the flags are checked by the LSMs and cap_bprm_set_creds() in commoncap.c.
cap_bprm_set_creds() just degrades the execution to a non-setuid-ish one,
and e.g. ptracers stay attached.
Same thing happens if the fs struct is shared with another process or if
NO_NEW_PRIVS is active.
(Actually, it's still a bit like normal setuid execution: IIRC AT_SECURE
stays active, and the resulting process still won't be dumpable, so it's
not possible for a *new* ptracer to attach afterwards. But this is just
from memory, I'm not entirely sure.)