Re: [REVIEW][PATCH] exec: Don't exec files the userns root can not read.
From: Andy Lutomirski
Date: Wed Oct 19 2016 - 14:38:50 EST
On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 10:55 AM, Eric W. Biederman
> Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 10:29 AM, Jann Horn <jann@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 11:52:50AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>> Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>>>> > Simply ptrace yourself, exec the
>>>> > program, and then dump the program out. A program that really wants
>>>> > to be unreadable should have a stub: the stub is setuid and readable,
>>>> > but all the stub does is to exec the real program, and the real
>>>> > program should have mode 0500 or similar.
>>>> > ISTM the "right" check would be to enforce that the program's new
>>>> > creds can read the program, but that will break backwards
>>>> > compatibility.
>>>> Last I looked I had the impression that exec of a setuid program kills
>>>> the ptrace.
>>>> If we are talking about a exec of a simple unreadable executable (aka
>>>> something that sets undumpable but is not setuid or setgid). Then I
>>>> agree it should break the ptrace as well and since those programs are as
>>>> rare as hens teeth I don't see any problem with changing the ptrace behavior
>>>> in that case.
>>> Nope. check_unsafe_exec() sets LSM_UNSAFE_* flags in bprm->unsafe, and then
>>> the flags are checked by the LSMs and cap_bprm_set_creds() in commoncap.c.
>>> cap_bprm_set_creds() just degrades the execution to a non-setuid-ish one,
>>> and e.g. ptracers stay attached.
>> I think you're right. I ought to be completely sure because I rewrote
>> that code back in 2005 or so back when I thought kernel programming
>> was only for the cool kids. It was probably my first kernel patch
>> ever and it closed an awkward-to-exploit root hole. But it's been a
>> while. (Too bad my second (IIRC) kernel patch was more mundane and
>> fixed the mute button on "new" Lenovo X60-era laptops and spend
>> several years in limbo...)
> Ah yes and this is only a problem if the ptracer does not have
> If the tracer does not have sufficient permissions any opinions on
> failing the exec or kicking out the ptracer? I am leaning towards failing
> the exec as it is more obvious if someone cares. Dropping the ptracer
> could be a major mystery.
I would suggest leaving it alone. Changing it could break enough
things that a sysctl would be needed, and I just don't see how this is
a significant issue, especially since it's been insecure forever.
Anyone who cares should do the stub executable trick:
/sbin/foo: 04755, literally just does execve("/sbin/foo-helper");