Re: [PATCH] fs, mm: account filp and names caches to kmemcg
From: Michal Hocko
Date: Mon Oct 09 2017 - 14:04:17 EST
[CC Johannes - the thread starts
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171005222144.123797-1-shakeelb@xxxxxxxxxx]
On Mon 09-10-17 10:52:44, Greg Thelen wrote:
> Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > On Fri 06-10-17 12:33:03, Shakeel Butt wrote:
> >> >> names_cachep = kmem_cache_create("names_cache", PATH_MAX, 0,
> >> >> - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> >> >> + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
> >> >
> >> > I might be wrong but isn't name cache only holding temporary objects
> >> > used for path resolution which are not stored anywhere?
> >> >
> >>
> >> Even though they're temporary, many containers can together use a
> >> significant amount of transient uncharged memory. We've seen machines
> >> with 100s of MiBs in names_cache.
> >
> > Yes that might be possible but are we prepared for random ENOMEM from
> > vfs calls which need to allocate a temporary name?
> >
> >>
> >> >> filp_cachep = kmem_cache_create("filp", sizeof(struct file), 0,
> >> >> - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> >> >> + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC | SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
> >> >> percpu_counter_init(&nr_files, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
> >> >> }
> >> >
> >> > Don't we have a limit for the maximum number of open files?
> >> >
> >>
> >> Yes, there is a system limit of maximum number of open files. However
> >> this limit is shared between different users on the system and one
> >> user can hog this resource. To cater that, we set the maximum limit
> >> very high and let the memory limit of each user limit the number of
> >> files they can open.
> >
> > Similarly here. Are all syscalls allocating a fd prepared to return
> > ENOMEM?
> >
> > --
> > Michal Hocko
> > SUSE Labs
>
> Even before this patch I find memcg oom handling inconsistent. Page
> cache pages trigger oom killer and may allow caller to succeed once the
> kernel retries. But kmem allocations don't call oom killer. They
> surface errors to user space. This makes memcg hard to use for memory
> overcommit because it's desirable for a high priority task to
> transparently kill a lower priority task using the memcg oom killer.
>
> A few ideas on how to make it more flexible:
>
> a) Go back to memcg oom killing within memcg charging. This runs risk
> of oom killing while caller holds locks which oom victim selection or
> oom victim termination may need. Google's been running this way for
> a while.
>
> b) Have every syscall return do something similar to page fault handler:
> kmem allocations in oom memcg mark the current task as needing an oom
> check return NULL. If marked oom, syscall exit would use
> mem_cgroup_oom_synchronize() before retrying the syscall. Seems
> risky. I doubt every syscall is compatible with such a restart.
>
> c) Overcharge kmem to oom memcg and queue an async memcg limit checker,
> which will oom kill if needed.
>
> Comments?
>
> Demo program which eventually gets ENOSPC from mkdir.
>
> $ cat /tmp/t
> while umount /tmp/mnt; do true; done
> mkdir -p /tmp/mnt
> mount -t tmpfs nodev /tmp/mnt
> cd /dev/cgroup/memory
> rmdir t
> mkdir t
> echo 32M > t/memory.limit_in_bytes
> (echo $BASHPID > t/cgroup.procs && cd /tmp/mnt && exec /tmp/mkdirs)
>
> $ cat /tmp/mkdirs.c
> #include <err.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <sys/mman.h>
> #include <sys/stat.h>
> #include <sys/types.h>
>
> int main()
> {
> int i;
> char name[32];
>
> if (mlockall(MCL_CURRENT|MCL_FUTURE))
> err(1, "mlockall");
> for (i = 0; i < (1<<20); i++) {
> sprintf(name, "%d", i);
> if (mkdir(name, 0700))
> err(1, "mkdir");
> }
> printf("done\n");
> return 0;
> }
--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs