Re: [PATCH V3] KSM: allow dedup all tasks memory

From: Jann Horn
Date: Tue Nov 13 2018 - 06:57:33 EST


On Tue, Nov 13, 2018 at 12:40 PM Timofey Titovets
<timofey.titovets@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> ksm by default working only on memory that added by
> madvise().
>
> And only way get that work on other applications:
> * Use LD_PRELOAD and libraries
> * Patch kernel
>
> Lets use kernel task list and add logic to import VMAs from tasks.
>
> That behaviour controlled by new attributes:
> * mode:
> I try mimic hugepages attribute, so mode have two states:
> * madvise - old default behaviour
> * always [new] - allow ksm to get tasks vma and
> try working on that.

Please don't. And if you really have to for some reason, put some big
warnings on this, advising people that it's a security risk.

KSM is one of the favorite punching bags of side-channel and hardware
security researchers:

As a gigantic, problematic side channel:
http://staff.aist.go.jp/k.suzaki/EuroSec2011-suzaki.pdf
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot15/woot15-paper-barresi.pdf
https://access.redhat.com/blogs/766093/posts/1976303
https://gruss.cc/files/dedup.pdf

In particular https://gruss.cc/files/dedup.pdf ("Practical Memory
Deduplication Attacks in Sandboxed JavaScript") shows that KSM makes
it possible to use malicious JavaScript to determine whether a given
page of memory exists elsewhere on your system.

And also as a way to target rowhammer-based faults:
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity16/sec16_paper_razavi.pdf
https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2017/10/19/attacking-co-hosted-vm-hacker-hammer-two-memory-modules/