Re: [RESEND PATCH] Allow hwrng to initialize crng.

[Louis Collard]

On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 4:51 PM Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 04:40:17PM +0800, Louis Collard wrote:
> > Some systems, for example embedded systems, do not generate
> > enough entropy on boot through interrupts, and boot may be blocked for
> > several minutes waiting for a call to getrandom to complete.
> >
> > Currently, random data is read from a hwrng when it is registered,
> > and is loaded into primary_crng. This data is treated in the same
> > way as data that is device-specific but otherwise unchanging, and
> > so primary_crng cannot become initialized with the data from the
> > hwrng.
> >
> > This change causes the data initially read from the hwrng to be
> > treated the same as subsequent data that is read from the hwrng if
> > it's quality score is non-zero.
> >
> > The implications of this are:
> >
> > The data read from hwrng can cause primary_crng to become
> > initialized, therefore avoiding problems of getrandom blocking
> > on boot.
> >
> > Calls to getrandom (with GRND_RANDOM) may be using entropy
> > exclusively (or in practise, almost exclusively) from the hwrng.
> >
> > Regarding the latter point; this behavior is the same as if a
> > user specified a quality score of 1 (bit of entropy per 1024 bits)
> > so hopefully this is not too scary a change to make.
> >
> > This change is the result of the discussion here:
> > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10453893/
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Louis Collard <louiscollard@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >  drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 9 +++++++--
> >  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> > index 95be7228f327..99c3e4127949 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> > @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
> >  #include <linux/sched.h>
> >  #include <linux/slab.h>
> >  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> > +#include <crypto/chacha20.h>
> >
> >  #define RNG_MODULE_NAME              "hw_random"
> >
> > @@ -64,13 +65,17 @@ static size_t rng_buffer_size(void)
> >  static void add_early_randomness(struct hwrng *rng)
> >  {
> >       int bytes_read;
> > -     size_t size = min_t(size_t, 16, rng_buffer_size());
> > +     /* Read enough to initialize crng. */
> > +     size_t size = 2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE;
> >
> >       mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
> >       bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_buffer, size, 1);
> >       mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
> >       if (bytes_read > 0)
> > -             add_device_randomness(rng_buffer, bytes_read);
> > +             /* Allow crng to become initialized, but do not add
> > +              * entropy to the pool.
> > +              */
> > +             add_hwgenerator_randomness(rng_buffer, bytes_read, 0);
> >  }
> >
> >  static inline void cleanup_rng(struct kref *kref)
> > --
> > 2.13.5
> >
>
> Adding Ted Ts'o to the cc list.
> --
> Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
> PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

Thanks - and apologies, just re-read this and realized I clearly
wasn't paying attention the first time, have sent a v2 that calculates
size correctly.