Re: [PATCH v5 07/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2

[Andre Przywara]

Hi,

On 2/26/19 7:05 PM, Jeremy Linton wrote:
> Add code to track whether all the cores in the machine are
> vulnerable, and whether all the vulnerable cores have been
> mitigated.
>
> Once we have that information we can add the sysfs stub and
> provide an accurate view of what is known about the machine.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@xxxxxxx>
> ---
>   arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>   1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> index a27e1ee750e1..0f6e8f5d67bc 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> @@ -513,6 +513,10 @@ cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
>   	.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,			\
>   	CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list)
>   
> +/* Track overall mitigation state. We are only mitigated if all cores are ok */
> +static bool __hardenbp_enab = true;
> +static bool __spectrev2_safe = true;
> +
>   /*
>    * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
>    */
> @@ -523,6 +527,10 @@ static const struct midr_range spectre_v2_safe_list[] = {
>   	{ /* sentinel */ }
>   };
>   
> +/*
> + * Track overall bp hardening for all heterogeneous cores in the machine.
> + * We are only considered "safe" if all booted cores are known safe.
> + */
>   static bool __maybe_unused
>   check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
>   {
> @@ -544,19 +552,25 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
>   	if (!need_wa)
>   		return false;
>   
> +	__spectrev2_safe = false;
> +
>   	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
>   		pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by configuration\n");
> +		__hardenbp_enab = false;
>   		return false;
>   	}
>   
>   	/* forced off */
>   	if (__nospectre_v2) {
>   		pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
> +		__hardenbp_enab = false;
>   		return false;
>   	}
>   
> -	if (need_wa < 0)
> +	if (need_wa < 0) {
>   		pr_warn_once("ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 missing from firmware\n");
> +		__hardenbp_enab = false;
> +	}
>   
>   	return (need_wa > 0);
>   }
> @@ -779,3 +793,15 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
>   {
>   	return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
>   }
> +
> +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
> +		char *buf)

w/s issue

Anyway:
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@xxxxxxx>

Cheers,
Andre.

> +{
> +	if (__spectrev2_safe)
> +		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
> +
> +	if (__hardenbp_enab)
> +		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n");
> +
> +	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
> +}