On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 02:54:28PM +0530, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:ok.
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
When pointer authentication is supported, a guest may wish to use it.
This patch adds the necessary KVM infrastructure for this to work, with
a semi-lazy context switch of the pointer auth state.
Pointer authentication feature is only enabled when VHE is built
in the kernel and present into CPU implementation so only VHE code
paths are modified.
When we schedule a vcpu, we disable guest usage of pointer
authentication instructions and accesses to the keys. While these are
disabled, we avoid context-switching the keys. When we trap the guest
trying to use pointer authentication functionality, we change to eagerly
context-switching the keys, and enable the feature. The next time the
vcpu is scheduled out/in, we start again. However the host key registers
are saved in vcpu load stage as they remain constant for each vcpu
schedule.
Pointer authentication consists of address authentication and generic
authentication, and CPUs in a system might have varied support for
either. Where support for either feature is not uniform, it is hidden
from guests via ID register emulation, as a result of the cpufeature
framework in the host.
Unfortunately, address authentication and generic authentication cannot
be trapped separately, as the architecture provides a single EL2 trap
covering both. If we wish to expose one without the other, we cannot
prevent a (badly-written) guest from intermittently using a feature
which is not uniformly supported (when scheduled on a physical CPU which
supports the relevant feature). Hence, this patch expects both type of
authentication to be present in a cpu.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
[Only VHE, key switch from from assembly, kvm_supports_ptrauth
checks, save host key in vcpu_load]
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@xxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@xxxxxxx>
Cc: kvmarm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
---
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 23 +++++++++
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h | 7 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 1 +
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c | 21 +++++---
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile | 1 +
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S | 17 +++++++
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 37 +++++++++++++-
virt/kvm/arm/arm.c | 2 +
10 files changed, 201 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c
[...]
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..528ee6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c: Guest/host ptrauth save/restore
+ *
+ * Copyright 2018 Arm Limited
+ * Author: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
+ * Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@xxxxxxx>
+ */
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpucaps.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_hyp.h>
+#include <asm/pointer_auth.h>
+
+static __always_inline bool __ptrauth_is_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH) &&
+ vcpu->arch.ctxt.hcr_el2 & (HCR_API | HCR_APK);
+}
+
+#define __ptrauth_save_key(regs, key) \
+({ \
+ regs[key ## KEYLO_EL1] = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ ## key ## KEYLO_EL1); \
+ regs[key ## KEYHI_EL1] = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ ## key ## KEYHI_EL1); \
+})
+
+static __always_inline void __ptrauth_save_state(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt)
Why __always_inline?
+{
+ __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIA);
+ __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIB);
+ __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDA);
+ __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDB);
+ __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APGA);
+}
+
+#define __ptrauth_restore_key(regs, key) \
+({ \
+ write_sysreg_s(regs[key ## KEYLO_EL1], SYS_ ## key ## KEYLO_EL1); \
+ write_sysreg_s(regs[key ## KEYHI_EL1], SYS_ ## key ## KEYHI_EL1); \
+})
+
+static __always_inline void __ptrauth_restore_state(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt)
Same here. I would hope these just need to be marked with the correct
function attribute to disable ptrauth by the compiler. I don't see why
it makes a difference whether it's inline or not.
If the compiler semantics are not sufficiently clear, make it a macro.
(Bikeshedding here, so it you feel this has already been discussed to
death I'm happy for this to stay as-is.)
+{
+ __ptrauth_restore_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIA);
+ __ptrauth_restore_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIB);
+ __ptrauth_restore_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDA);
+ __ptrauth_restore_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDB);
+ __ptrauth_restore_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APGA);
+}
+
+/**
+ * This function changes the key so assign Pointer Authentication safe
+ * GCC attribute if protected by it.
+ */
(I'd have preferred to keep __noptrauth here and define it do nothing for
now. But I'll defer to others on that, since this has already been
discussed...)
No there is not reset of registers. May be name like kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_setup_lazy would be better.
+void __ptrauth_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt,
+ struct kvm_cpu_context *guest_ctxt)
+{
+ if (!__ptrauth_is_enabled(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ __ptrauth_restore_state(guest_ctxt);
+}
+
+/**
+ * This function changes the key so assign Pointer Authentication safe
+ * GCC attribute if protected by it.
+ */
+void __ptrauth_switch_to_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct kvm_cpu_context *guest_ctxt,
+ struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
+{
+ if (!__ptrauth_is_enabled(vcpu))
+ return;
+
+ __ptrauth_save_state(guest_ctxt);
+ __ptrauth_restore_state(host_ctxt);
+}
+
+/**
+ * kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_reset - resets ptrauth for vcpu schedule
+ *
+ * @vcpu: The VCPU pointer
+ *
+ * This function may be used to disable ptrauth and use it in a lazy context
+ * via traps. However host key registers are saved here as they dont change
+ * during host/guest switch.
+ */
+void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
I feel this is not a good name. It sounds too much like it resets the
registers as part of vcpu reset, whereas really it's doing something
completely different.
(Do you reset the regs anywhere btw? I may have missed it...)
ok.
+{
+ struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt;
+
+ if (kvm_supports_ptrauth()) {
+ kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_disable(vcpu);
+ host_ctxt = vcpu->arch.host_cpu_context;
+ __ptrauth_save_state(host_ctxt);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
index a6c9381..12529df 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
@@ -986,6 +986,32 @@ static bool access_pmuserenr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct sys_reg_params *p,
{ SYS_DESC(SYS_PMEVTYPERn_EL0(n)), \
access_pmu_evtyper, reset_unknown, (PMEVTYPER0_EL0 + n), }
+
+void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_enable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ vcpu->arch.ctxt.hcr_el2 |= (HCR_API | HCR_APK);
Pedantic nit: surplus ().
(Although opinions differ, and keeping them looks more symmetric with
kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_disable() -- either way, the code can stay as-is if
you prefer.)
+}
+
+void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_disable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ vcpu->arch.ctxt.hcr_el2 &= ~(HCR_API | HCR_APK);
+}
+
+static bool trap_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct sys_reg_params *p,
+ const struct sys_reg_desc *rd)
+{
+ kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap(vcpu);
+ return false;
Can we ever get here? Won't PAC traps always be handled via
handle_exit()?
Or can we also take sysreg access traps when the guest tries to access
the ptrauth key registers?
Not sure. Need to check.
(I'm now wondering how this works for SVE.)
Yes agreed. I will add proper checks here to skip prints for non ptrauth hosts.
+}
+
+#define __PTRAUTH_KEY(k) \
+ { SYS_DESC(SYS_## k), trap_ptrauth, reset_unknown, k }
+
+#define PTRAUTH_KEY(k) \
+ __PTRAUTH_KEY(k ## KEYLO_EL1), \
+ __PTRAUTH_KEY(k ## KEYHI_EL1)
+
static bool access_cntp_tval(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct sys_reg_params *p,
const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
@@ -1045,9 +1071,10 @@ static u64 read_id_reg(struct sys_reg_desc const *r, bool raz)
(0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) |
(0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) |
(0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT);
- if (val & ptrauth_mask)
+ if (!kvm_supports_ptrauth()) {
Don't we now always print this when ptrauth is not supported?
Previously we only printed a message in the interesting case, i.e.,
where the host supports ptrauch but we cannot offer it to the guest.
kvm_debug("ptrauth unsupported for guests, suppressing\n");
- val &= ~ptrauth_mask;
+ val &= ~ptrauth_mask;
+ }
} else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1) {
if (val & (0xfUL << ID_AA64MMFR1_LOR_SHIFT))
kvm_debug("LORegions unsupported for guests, suppressing\n");
@@ -1316,6 +1343,12 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = {
{ SYS_DESC(SYS_TTBR1_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, TTBR1_EL1 },
{ SYS_DESC(SYS_TCR_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_val, TCR_EL1, 0 },
+ PTRAUTH_KEY(APIA),
+ PTRAUTH_KEY(APIB),
+ PTRAUTH_KEY(APDA),
+ PTRAUTH_KEY(APDB),
+ PTRAUTH_KEY(APGA),
+
{ SYS_DESC(SYS_AFSR0_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, AFSR0_EL1 },
{ SYS_DESC(SYS_AFSR1_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, AFSR1_EL1 },
{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ESR_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, ESR_EL1 },
diff --git a/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c b/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c
index 2032a66..d7e003f 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c
@@ -388,6 +388,8 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
vcpu_clear_wfe_traps(vcpu);
else
vcpu_set_wfe_traps(vcpu);
+
+ kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_reset(vcpu);
}
void kvm_arch_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
--
2.7.4
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