Re: [PATCH RFC v4 1/1] random: WARN on large getrandom() waits and introduce getrandom2()

[Theodore Y. Ts'o]

On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 08:50:15AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> .. btw, instead of bad workarounds for a theoretical attack, here's
> something that should add actual *practical* real value: use the time
> of day (whether from an RTC device, or from ntp) to add noise to the
> random pool.

Actally, we used to seed the pool from the RTC device --- that was the
case in the 3.4 kernel referenced by the Blackhat attack, and it
didn't stop the researchers.  In later kernels, we moved up when
rand_initialized() got called to before time_init(), so
init_std_data() was no longer seeding the pool from the RTC clock.

That being said, adding calls to add_device_randomness() to
do_settimeofday64() and timekeeping_inject_offset() is an obviously
good thing to do.  I'll prepare a separate patch for the random.git
tree to do that.

					- Ted