Re: [PATCH] tpm: Salt tpm_get_random() result with get_random_bytes()

[Jason Gunthorpe]

On Wed, Oct 16, 2019 at 01:43:22PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 16, 2019 at 01:38:05PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 15, 2019 at 02:04:50PM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > > On Tue, Oct 15, 2019 at 03:47:02PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > Salt the result that comes from the TPM RNG with random bytes from the
> > > > kernel RNG. This will allow to use tpm_get_random() as a substitute for
> > > > get_random_bytes().  TPM could have a bug (making results predicatable),
> > > > backdoor or even an inteposer in the bus. Salting gives protections
> > > > against these concerns.
> > > 
> > > Seems like a dangerous use case, why would any kernel user that cared
> > > about quality of randomness ever call a tpm_* API to get quality
> > > random data?
> > 
> > This is related to this discussion:
> > 
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/CAE=NcrY3BTvD-L2XP6bsO=9oAJLtSD0wYpUymVkAGAnYObsPzQ@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/T/#t
> > 
> > I could also move this to the call site.
> 
> But I hear you anyway.
> 
> I think for trusted keys the best strategy would be to do
> exactly this:
> 
> 1. Generate one random value with get_random_bytes_arch()
> 2. Generate another with backend specific technology (we
>    have now two TPM and TEE) if an RNG available.
> 3. Xor the values together.

Feels like something the random core should handle - maybe some way to
say 'my trust model requires trust in this RNG' and then the random
core can more heavily weight data from that RNG

Jason