Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] Optionally flush L1D on context switch

[Thomas Gleixner]

Balbir Singh <sblbir@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:

> Implement a mechanism to selectively flush the L1D cache. The goal is to
> allow tasks that are paranoid due to the recent snoop assisted data sampling
> vulnerabilites, to flush their L1D on being switched out.  This protects
> their data from being snooped or leaked via side channels after the task
> has context switched out.
>
> There are two scenarios we might want to protect against, a task leaving
> the CPU with data still in L1D (which is the main concern of this patch),
> the second scenario is a malicious task coming in (not so well trusted)
> for which we want to clean up the cache before it starts. Only the case
> for the former is addressed.
>
> A new thread_info flag TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D is added to track tasks which
> opt-into L1D flushing. cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec is used to convert
> the TIF flags into mm state (per cpu via last_user_mm_spec) in
> cond_mitigation(), which then used to do decide when to call flush_l1d().
>
> Add prctl()'s to opt-in to the L1D cache on context switch out, the
> existing mechanisms of tracking prev_mm via cpu_tlbstate is
> reused to track state of the tasks and to flush the L1D cache.
> The prctl interface is generic and can be ported over to other
> architectures.
>
> Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <sblbir@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h |  7 ++++-
>  arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                  | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  include/uapi/linux/prctl.h         |  4 +++
>  kernel/sys.c                       | 20 ++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
> index 8de8ceccb8bc..67de693d9ba1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
> @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ struct thread_info {
>  #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	7	/* syscall auditing active */
>  #define TIF_SECCOMP		8	/* secure computing */
>  #define TIF_SPEC_IB		9	/* Indirect branch speculation mitigation */
> -#define TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE	10	/* Force speculation MSR update in context switch */
> +#define TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D	10	/* Flush L1D on mm switches (processes) */
>  #define TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY	11	/* notify kernel of userspace return */
>  #define TIF_UPROBE		12	/* breakpointed or singlestepping */
>  #define TIF_PATCH_PENDING	13	/* pending live patching update */
> @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ struct thread_info {
>  #define TIF_MEMDIE		20	/* is terminating due to OOM killer */
>  #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	21	/* idle is polling for TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
>  #define TIF_IO_BITMAP		22	/* uses I/O bitmap */
> +#define TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE	23	/* Force speculation MSR update in context switch */
>  #define TIF_FORCED_TF		24	/* true if TF in eflags artificially */
>  #define TIF_BLOCKSTEP		25	/* set when we want DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF */
>  #define TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES	27	/* task is updating the mmu lazily */
> @@ -132,6 +133,7 @@ struct thread_info {
>  #define _TIF_ADDR32		(1 << TIF_ADDR32)
>  #define _TIF_X32		(1 << TIF_X32)
>  #define _TIF_FSCHECK		(1 << TIF_FSCHECK)
> +#define _TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D	(1 << TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D)

Bah. These defines are ordered in the same way as the TIF defines....

>  /*
> - * Bits to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB state into the mm pointer which is
> + * Bits to mangle the TIF_SPEC_* state into the mm pointer which is
>   * stored in cpu_tlb_state.last_user_mm_spec.
>   */
>  #define LAST_USER_MM_IBPB	0x1UL
> -#define LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK	(LAST_USER_MM_IBPB)
> +#define LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH	0x2UL
> +#define LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK	(LAST_USER_MM_IBPB | LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH)

You lost

+       BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D != TIF_SPEC_IB + 1);

from patch I gave you.