Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] Optionally flush L1D on context switch

From: Singh, Balbir
Date: Thu May 14 2020 - 17:28:58 EST


On Wed, 2020-05-13 at 17:27 +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
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>
> Balbir Singh <sblbir@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
> > Implement a mechanism to selectively flush the L1D cache. The goal
> > is to
> > allow tasks that are paranoid due to the recent snoop assisted data
> > sampling
> > vulnerabilites, to flush their L1D on being switched out. This
> > protects
> > their data from being snooped or leaked via side channels after the
> > task
> > has context switched out.
> >
> > There are two scenarios we might want to protect against, a task
> > leaving
> > the CPU with data still in L1D (which is the main concern of this
> > patch),
> > the second scenario is a malicious task coming in (not so well
> > trusted)
> > for which we want to clean up the cache before it starts. Only the
> > case
> > for the former is addressed.
> >
> > A new thread_info flag TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D is added to track tasks
> > which
> > opt-into L1D flushing. cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec is used to
> > convert
> > the TIF flags into mm state (per cpu via last_user_mm_spec) in
> > cond_mitigation(), which then used to do decide when to call
> > flush_l1d().
> >
> > Add prctl()'s to opt-in to the L1D cache on context switch out, the
> > existing mechanisms of tracking prev_mm via cpu_tlbstate is
> > reused to track state of the tasks and to flush the L1D cache.
> > The prctl interface is generic and can be ported over to other
> > architectures.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <sblbir@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 7 ++++-
> > arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 44
> > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> > include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 4 +++
> > kernel/sys.c | 20 ++++++++++++++
> > 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
> > b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
> > index 8de8ceccb8bc..67de693d9ba1 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
> > @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ struct thread_info {
> > #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing active */
> > #define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* secure computing */
> > #define TIF_SPEC_IB 9 /* Indirect branch speculation
> > mitigation */
> > -#define TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE 10 /* Force speculation
> > MSR update in context switch */
> > +#define TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D 10 /* Flush L1D on mm switches
> > (processes) */
> > #define TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY 11 /* notify kernel of
> > userspace return */
> > #define TIF_UPROBE 12 /* breakpointed or
> > singlestepping */
> > #define TIF_PATCH_PENDING 13 /* pending live patching
> > update */
> > @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ struct thread_info {
> > #define TIF_MEMDIE 20 /* is terminating due to OOM
> > killer */
> > #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG 21 /* idle is polling for
> > TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
> > #define TIF_IO_BITMAP 22 /* uses I/O bitmap */
> > +#define TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE 23 /* Force speculation
> > MSR update in context switch */
> > #define TIF_FORCED_TF 24 /* true if TF in
> > eflags artificially */
> > #define TIF_BLOCKSTEP 25 /* set when we want
> > DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF */
> > #define TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES 27 /* task is updating the mmu
> > lazily */
> > @@ -132,6 +133,7 @@ struct thread_info {
> > #define _TIF_ADDR32 (1 << TIF_ADDR32)
> > #define _TIF_X32 (1 << TIF_X32)
> > #define _TIF_FSCHECK (1 << TIF_FSCHECK)
> > +#define _TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D (1 << TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D)
>
> Bah. These defines are ordered in the same way as the TIF defines....
>
> > /*
> > - * Bits to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB state into the mm pointer which
> > is
> > + * Bits to mangle the TIF_SPEC_* state into the mm pointer which is
> > * stored in cpu_tlb_state.last_user_mm_spec.
> > */
> > #define LAST_USER_MM_IBPB 0x1UL
> > -#define LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK (LAST_USER_MM_IBPB)
> > +#define LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH 0x2UL
> > +#define LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK (LAST_USER_MM_IBPB |
> > LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH)
>
> You lost
>
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D != TIF_SPEC_IB + 1);
>
> from patch I gave you.


Oops.. I'll fix up both and redo patch 5/6, by splitting it up, into
interface vs flush bits

Thanks,
Balbir Singh.