[PATCH] mm: thp: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones

[Alexander A. Klimov]

Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.

Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
  If not .svg:
    For each line:
      If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
        For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
	  If neither `\bgnu\.org/license`, nor `\bmozilla\.org/MPL\b`:
            If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
            return 200 OK and serve the same content:
              Replace HTTP with HTTPS.

Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 Continuing my work started at 93431e0607e5.
 See also: git log --oneline '--author=Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@xxxxxxxxxxxx>' v5.7..master
 (Actually letting a shell for loop submit all this stuff for me.)

 If there are any URLs to be removed completely or at least not just HTTPSified:
 Just clearly say so and I'll *undo my change*.
 See also: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/6/27/64

 If there are any valid, but yet not changed URLs:
 See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/6/26/837

 If you apply the patch, please let me know.

 Sorry again to all maintainers who complained about subject lines.
 Now I realized that you want an actually perfect prefixes,
 not just subsystem ones.
 I tried my best...
 And yes, *I could* (at least half-)automate it.
 Impossible is nothing! :)


 mm/huge_memory.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 78c84bee7e29..9e4b78cf73ab 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -2069,7 +2069,7 @@ static void __split_huge_pmd_locked(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,
 	 * free), userland could trigger a small page size TLB miss on the
 	 * small sized TLB while the hugepage TLB entry is still established in
 	 * the huge TLB. Some CPU doesn't like that.
-	 * See http://support.amd.com/us/Processor_TechDocs/41322.pdf, Erratum
+	 * See https://support.amd.com/us/Processor_TechDocs/41322.pdf, Erratum
 	 * 383 on page 93. Intel should be safe but is also warns that it's
 	 * only safe if the permission and cache attributes of the two entries
 	 * loaded in the two TLB is identical (which should be the case here).
-- 
2.27.0