On Mon, Sep 13 2021 at 16:54, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
On Mon, Sep 13, 2021 at 09:38:30PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:Whatever:
On Mon, Sep 13 2021 at 15:07, Jason Wang wrote:started not completed. device is allowed to send
On Mon, Sep 13, 2021 at 2:50 PM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:If that assumption exists, then you better keep the interrupt line
I'm not sure how it is related to the indirect descriptor but anBut doen't "irq is disabled" basically mean "we told the hypervisorMore generally, can't we for example blow away the
to disable the irq"? What extractly prevents hypervisor from
sending the irq even if guest thinks it disabled it?
indir_desc array that we use to keep the ctx pointers?
Won't that be enough?
example is that all the current driver will assume:
1) the interrupt won't be raised before virtio_device_ready()
2) the interrupt won't be raised after reset()
disabled until virtio_device_ready() has completed
config interrupts right after DRIVER_OK status is set by
virtio_device_ready.
* Define the exact point from which on the driver is able to handle the
interrupt and put the enable after that point
* Define the exact point from which on the driver is unable to handle
the interrupt and put the disable before that point
The above is blury.
See my reply to the next patch. The problem is the same:and disable it againWe can do this for some MSIX interrupts, sure. Not for shared interrupts though.
before reset() is invoked. That's a question of general robustness and
not really a question of trusted hypervisors and encrypted guests.
* Define the exact point from which on the driver is able to handle the
interrupt and allow the handler to proceed after that point
* Define the exact point from which on the driver is unable to handle
the interrupt and ensure that the handler denies to proceed before
that point
Same story just a different mechanism.
Thanks,
tglx