On Tue, Mar 14, 2023, at 3:13 AM, Evgeniy Baskov wrote:
This patchset is aimed
* to improve UEFI compatibility of compressed kernel code for x86_64
* to setup proper memory access attributes for code and rodata sections
* to implement W^X protection policy throughout the whole execution
of compressed kernel for EFISTUB code path.
The overall code quality seems okay, but I have some questions as to
what this is for. The early boot environment is not exposed to most
sorts of attacks -- there's no userspace, there's no network, and
there is not a whole lot of input that isn't implicitly completely
trusted.
What parts of this series are actually needed to get these fancy new
bootloaders to boot Linux? And why?
Kernel is made to be more compatible with PE image specification [3],
allowing it to be successfully loaded by stricter PE loader
implementations like the one from [2]. There is at least one
known implementation that uses that loader in production [4].
There are also ongoing efforts to upstream these changes.
Can you clarify
Also the patchset adds EFI_MEMORY_ATTTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL, included into
EFI specification since version 2.10, as a better alternative to
using DXE services for memory protection attributes manipulation,
since it is defined by the UEFI specification itself and not UEFI PI
specification. This protocol is not widely available so the code
using DXE services is kept in place as a fallback in case specific
implementation does not support the new protocol.
One of EFI implementations that already support
EFI_MEMORY_ATTTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL is Microsoft Project Mu [5].
Maybe make this a separate series?
Kernel image generation tool (tools/build.c) is refactored as a part
of changes that makes PE image more compatible.
The patchset implements memory protection for compressed kernel
code while executing both inside EFI boot services and outside of
them. For EFISTUB code path W^X protection policy is maintained
throughout the whole execution of compressed kernel. The latter
is achieved by extracting the kernel directly from EFI environment
and jumping to it's head immediately after exiting EFI boot services.
As a side effect of this change one page table rebuild and a copy of
the kernel image is removed.
I have no problem with this, but what's it needed for?
Memory protection inside EFI environment is controlled by the
CONFIG_DXE_MEM_ATTRIBUTES option, although with these patches this
option also control the use EFI_MEMORY_ATTTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL and memory
protection attributes of PE sections and not only DXE services as the
name might suggest.
[1]
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/893da11995f93a7ea8f7485d17bf356a@xxxxxxxxx/
[2] https://github.com/acidanthera/audk/tree/secure_pe
Link is broken
[3]
https://download.microsoft.com/download/9/c/5/9c5b2167-8017-4bae-9fde-d599bac8184a/pecoff_v83.docx
I skimmed this very briefly, and I have no idea what I'm supposed to
look at. This is the entire PE spec!