Re: Semantics of blktrace with lockdown (integrity) enabled kernel.

[Paul Moore]

On Mon, Apr 10, 2023 at 3:20 PM Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 4/6/23 2:43 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Thu, Apr 6, 2023 at 3:33 PM Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
> > <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> On Thu, Apr 06, 2023 at 02:39:57PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > ...
> >
> >>> Before we go any further, can you please verify that your issue is
> >>> reproducible on a supported, upstream tree (preferably Linus')?
> >> Yes. Very much so.
> > Okay, in that case I suspect the issue is due to the somewhat limited
> > granularity in the lockdown LSM.  While there are a number of
> > different lockdown "levels", the reality is that the admin has to
> > choose from either NONE, INTEGRITY, or CONFIDENTIALITY.  Without
> > digging to deep into the code path that you would be hitting, we can
> > see that TRACEFS is blocked by the CONFIDENTIALITY (and therefore
> > INTEGRITY too) setting and DEBUGFS is blocked by the INTEGRITY
> > setting.  With DEBUGFS blocked by INTEGRITY, the only lockdown option
> > that would allow DEBUGFS is NONE.
> >
> > Without knowing too much about blktrace beyond the manpage, it looks
> > like it has the ability to trace/snoop on the block device operations
> > so I don't think this is something we would want to allow in a
> > "locked" system.
>
> blktrace depends on tracepoint in block layer to trace io events of
> block devices,
>
> through the test with mainline, those tracepoints were not blocked by
> lockdown.
>
> If snoop block devices operations is a security concern in lock down, these
>
> tracepoints should be disabled?

Possibly, however, as I said earlier I'm not very familiar with
blktrace and the associated tracepoints.  If it is possible to snoop
on kernel/user data using blktrace then it probably should be
protected by a lockdown control point.

Is this something you could verify and potentially submit a patch to resolve?

-- 
paul-moore.com