On Mon, Apr 10, 2023 at 3:20 PM Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 4/6/23 2:43 PM, Paul Moore wrote:Possibly, however, as I said earlier I'm not very familiar with
On Thu, Apr 6, 2023 at 3:33 PM Konrad Rzeszutek Wilkblktrace depends on tracepoint in block layer to trace io events of
<konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Thu, Apr 06, 2023 at 02:39:57PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:...
Okay, in that case I suspect the issue is due to the somewhat limitedBefore we go any further, can you please verify that your issue isYes. Very much so.
reproducible on a supported, upstream tree (preferably Linus')?
granularity in the lockdown LSM. While there are a number of
different lockdown "levels", the reality is that the admin has to
choose from either NONE, INTEGRITY, or CONFIDENTIALITY. Without
digging to deep into the code path that you would be hitting, we can
see that TRACEFS is blocked by the CONFIDENTIALITY (and therefore
INTEGRITY too) setting and DEBUGFS is blocked by the INTEGRITY
setting. With DEBUGFS blocked by INTEGRITY, the only lockdown option
that would allow DEBUGFS is NONE.
Without knowing too much about blktrace beyond the manpage, it looks
like it has the ability to trace/snoop on the block device operations
so I don't think this is something we would want to allow in a
"locked" system.
block devices,
through the test with mainline, those tracepoints were not blocked by
lockdown.
If snoop block devices operations is a security concern in lock down, these
tracepoints should be disabled?
blktrace and the associated tracepoints. If it is possible to snoop
on kernel/user data using blktrace then it probably should be
protected by a lockdown control point.
Is this something you could verify and potentially submit a patch to resolve?