[PATCH] hwrng: virtio: reject invalid used.len from the device

[Michael Bommarito]

random_recv_done() stored the device-reported used.len directly into
vi->data_avail without validating it against the posted buffer size
sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32 or 64).  A
malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend could set used.len beyond
vi->data so that the subsequent copy_data() in virtio_read() issues
memcpy() from vi->data + vi->data_idx past the end of the inline
array, reading adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes into the hwrng core's
buffer and from there into /dev/hwrng consumers and the kernel
entropy pool.

Exploitable most clearly in threat models that do not trust the
hypervisor (confidential-compute guests on SEV-SNP or TDX; vhost-user
split backends).

KASAN confirms the OOB on a guest booted under a QEMU 9.0 whose
virtio-rng backend has been patched to report used.len = 0x10000:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0
  Read of size 64 at addr ffff8880089c2220 by task hwrng/52
  Call Trace:
   __asan_memcpy
   virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0
   hwrng_fillfn+0xb2/0x470
   kthread
  Allocated by task 1:
   probe_common+0xa5/0x660
   virtio_dev_probe+0x549/0xbc0
  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880089c2000
   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
  The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
   allocated 544-byte region [ffff8880089c2000, ffff8880089c2220)

hwrng_fillfn is a kernel thread that runs as soon as the device is
probed; no guest userspace interaction is needed.

Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"),
which hardened usb9pfs_rx_complete against unchecked device-reported
length in the USB 9p transport.

With the added len-vs-sizeof(vi->data) clamp in place the same
harness boots cleanly: the driver logs "bogus used.len" once and
subsequent reads wait for a honest response.

Fixes: f7f510ec1957 ("virtio: An entropy device, as suggested by hpa.")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@xxxxxxxxx>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
index 0ce02d7e5048..6cff480787ca 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
@@ -47,6 +47,18 @@ static void random_recv_done(struct virtqueue *vq)
 	if (!virtqueue_get_buf(vi->vq, &len))
 		return;
 
+	/*
+	 * The device sets used.len; a malicious or buggy backend can
+	 * report more bytes than we posted.  Clamp before it reaches
+	 * copy_data() which indexes vi->data[].
+	 */
+	if (len > sizeof(vi->data)) {
+		dev_err(&vq->vdev->dev,
+			"bogus used.len %u > buffer size %zu\n",
+			len, sizeof(vi->data));
+		len = 0;
+	}
+
 	smp_store_release(&vi->data_avail, len);
 	complete(&vi->have_data);
 }
-- 
2.53.0