[PATCH] Bluetooth: virtio_bt: clamp rx length before skb_put
From: Michael Bommarito
Date: Fri Apr 17 2026 - 20:02:21 EST
virtbt_rx_work() calls skb_put(skb, len) where len comes directly
from virtqueue_get_buf() with no validation against the skb we
posted. The RX skb is allocated as alloc_skb(1000) in
virtbt_add_inbuf(). A malicious or buggy virtio-bt backend that
reports used.len larger than the skb's tailroom causes skb_put() to
call skb_over_panic() in net/core/skbuff.c, which triggers
BUG() and panics the guest.
Reproduced on a QEMU 9.0 whose virtio-bt backend reports
used.len = 4096 into a 1000-byte rx skb:
skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff83958e84 len:4096 put:4096
head:ffff88800c071000 data:ffff88800c071000 tail:0x1000
end:0x6c0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!
Call Trace:
skb_panic+0x160/0x162
skb_put.cold+0x31/0x31
virtbt_rx_work+0x94/0x250
process_one_work+0x80d/0x1510
worker_thread+0x4af/0xd20
kthread+0x2cc/0x3a0
Reject any len that exceeds skb_tailroom(). Drop the skb on the
error path; virtbt_add_inbuf() reposts a fresh one for the next
iteration. With the check in place the same harness runs without
BUG(); the driver logs "rx reply len %u exceeds skb tailroom %u"
and the device keeps running.
Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"),
which hardened the USB 9p transport against unchecked device-reported length.
Fixes: 160fbcf3bfb9 ("Bluetooth: virtio_bt: Use skb_put to set length")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: Soenke Huster <soenke.huster@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@xxxxxxxxx>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c b/drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c
index 76d61af8a275..157e68b6e75f 100644
--- a/drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c
@@ -227,8 +227,15 @@ static void virtbt_rx_work(struct work_struct *work)
if (!skb)
return;
- skb_put(skb, len);
- virtbt_rx_handle(vbt, skb);
+ if (len > skb_tailroom(skb)) {
+ bt_dev_err(vbt->hdev,
+ "rx reply len %u exceeds skb tailroom %u\n",
+ len, skb_tailroom(skb));
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ } else {
+ skb_put(skb, len);
+ virtbt_rx_handle(vbt, skb);
+ }
if (virtbt_add_inbuf(vbt) < 0)
return;
--
2.53.0