Re: [PATCH 2/3] Documentation: security-bugs: explain what is and is not a security bug

[Willy Tarreau]

Hi Demi Marie,

On Sat, May 02, 2026 at 01:20:10AM -0400, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> >>> Ah, but USB does cover "some" modification of devices, so this is going
> >>> to be something that is good to document over time, if for no other
> >>> reason to keep these scanning tools in check from hallucinating crazy
> >>> situations that are obviously not a valid thing we care about.
> >>
> >> OK but does this mean you still want to get these reports in the end ?
> > 
> > I want a patch if a user cares about that threat-model (as Android does
> > but no one else) as it's up to the user groups that want to change the
> > default kernel's behavior like this to actually submit patches to do so.
> FYI, I don't think this is limited to Android.  Chrome OS definitely
> cares about malicious USB devices, and the whole purpose of USBGuard is
> to prevent a USB device from being able to compromise the system unless
> authorized.  I believe Qubes OS also cares, as it supports USB device
> assignment to virtual machines.  CCing qubes-devel for confirmation.
> 
> What should that patch look like?  Could there be a way for these user
> groups to be informed of vulnerabilities in the USB subsystem, so that
> they can take responsibility for fixing them before they become public?

I've posted a proposal elsewhere in the same thread:

   https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/afSxSX8RK0Z4kkOI@xxxxxx/

> It does make sense for those who care about the security of a subsystem
> to be responsible for vulnerabilities in that system, but right now
> I'm not sure how one would offer to take up that responsibility.

I think that at least some subsystems will want to add their own
restrictions based on the bug reports they keep receiving, and I hope
it can help distros figure where there's a gap between is promised to
users and what the kernel promises, that needs to be filled by userland
verification tools for example.

Willy