Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: no recursive read_lock of policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid()

From: Waiman Long
Date: Mon Jun 23 2014 - 10:30:34 EST


On 06/23/2014 08:34 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
On 06/20/2014 08:30 PM, Waiman Long wrote:
v1->v2:
- Add an internal helper to switch on/off lock acquisition instead
of modifying the external API.

With introduction of fair queued rwlock, recursive read_lock() may hang
the offending process if there is a write_lock() somewhere in between.

With recursive read_lock checking enabled, the following error was
reported:

=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
3.16.0-rc1 #2 Tainted: G E
---------------------------------------------
load_policy/708 is trying to acquire lock:
(policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b32a>]
security_genfs_sid+0x3a/0x170

but task is already holding lock:
(policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b48c>]
security_fs_use+0x2c/0x110

other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:

CPU0
----
lock(policy_rwlock);
lock(policy_rwlock);

This patch fixes the occurrence of recursive read_lock() of
policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid() by adding a helper function
which has a 5th argument to indicate if the rwlock has been taken.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long<Waiman.Long@xxxxxx>
---
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 4bca494..5f4c1f3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2277,20 +2277,22 @@ out:
}

/**
- * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
* @fstype: filesystem type
* @path: path from root of mount
* @sclass: file security class
* @sid: SID for path
+ * @locked: true if policy_rwlock taken
*
* Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
* cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
* transition SIDs or task SIDs.
*/
-int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
- char *path,
- u16 orig_sclass,
- u32 *sid)
+static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+ char *path,
+ u16 orig_sclass,
+ u32 *sid,
+ int locked)
{
int len;
u16 sclass;
@@ -2301,7 +2303,8 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
while (path[0] == '/'&& path[1] == '/')
path++;

- read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ if (!locked)
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
I believe that this kind of conditional lock-taking is frowned upon in
the kernel, although I could be wrong. I think it would be cleaner to
instead just unconditionally take and release the lock around the call
to this helper in security_genfs_sid(), and not do so around the call to
it from security_fs_use().

Thank for the comments. Will send out a new patch with the suggested change.

-Longman

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