[PATCH 4.14 060/167] x86/entry/64: Interleave XOR register clearing with PUSH instructions

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dominik Brodowski <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit f7bafa2b05ef25eda1d9179fd930b0330cf2b7d1 upstream.

Same as is done for syscalls, interleave XOR with PUSH instructions
for exceptions/interrupts, in order to minimize the cost of the
additional instructions required for register clearing.

Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180211104949.12992-4-linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h  |   40 +++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S |   30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -101,44 +101,42 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
 	addq	$-(15*8), %rsp
 	.endm
 
-	.macro SAVE_REGS offset=0
+	.macro SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS offset=0
+	/*
+	 * Save registers and sanitize registers of values that a
+	 * speculation attack might otherwise want to exploit. The
+	 * lower registers are likely clobbered well before they
+	 * could be put to use in a speculative execution gadget.
+	 * Interleave XOR with PUSH for better uop scheduling:
+	 */
 	movq %rdi, 14*8+\offset(%rsp)
 	movq %rsi, 13*8+\offset(%rsp)
 	movq %rdx, 12*8+\offset(%rsp)
 	movq %rcx, 11*8+\offset(%rsp)
 	movq %rax, 10*8+\offset(%rsp)
 	movq %r8,  9*8+\offset(%rsp)
+	xorq %r8, %r8				/* nospec r8 */
 	movq %r9,  8*8+\offset(%rsp)
+	xorq %r9, %r9				/* nospec r9 */
 	movq %r10, 7*8+\offset(%rsp)
+	xorq %r10, %r10				/* nospec r10 */
 	movq %r11, 6*8+\offset(%rsp)
+	xorq %r11, %r11				/* nospec r11 */
 	movq %rbx, 5*8+\offset(%rsp)
+	xorl %ebx, %ebx				/* nospec rbx */
 	movq %rbp, 4*8+\offset(%rsp)
+	xorl %ebp, %ebp				/* nospec rbp */
 	movq %r12, 3*8+\offset(%rsp)
+	xorq %r12, %r12				/* nospec r12 */
 	movq %r13, 2*8+\offset(%rsp)
+	xorq %r13, %r13				/* nospec r13 */
 	movq %r14, 1*8+\offset(%rsp)
+	xorq %r14, %r14				/* nospec r14 */
 	movq %r15, 0*8+\offset(%rsp)
+	xorq %r15, %r15				/* nospec r15 */
 	UNWIND_HINT_REGS offset=\offset
 	.endm
 
-	/*
-	 * Sanitize registers of values that a speculation attack
-	 * might otherwise want to exploit. The lower registers are
-	 * likely clobbered well before they could be put to use in
-	 * a speculative execution gadget:
-	 */
-	.macro CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
-	xorl %ebp, %ebp
-	xorl %ebx, %ebx
-	xorq %r8, %r8
-	xorq %r9, %r9
-	xorq %r10, %r10
-	xorq %r11, %r11
-	xorq %r12, %r12
-	xorq %r13, %r13
-	xorq %r14, %r14
-	xorq %r15, %r15
-	.endm
-
 	.macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1 skip_r11rcx=0
 	popq %r15
 	popq %r14
@@ -177,7 +175,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
  * is just setting the LSB, which makes it an invalid stack address and is also
  * a signal to the unwinder that it's a pt_regs pointer in disguise.
  *
- * NOTE: This macro must be used *after* SAVE_REGS because it corrupts
+ * NOTE: This macro must be used *after* SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS because it corrupts
  * the original rbp.
  */
 .macro ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER ptregs_offset=0
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -561,8 +561,7 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
 1:
 
 	ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
-	SAVE_REGS
-	CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
+	SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS
 	ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
 
 	testb	$3, CS(%rsp)
@@ -1108,8 +1107,7 @@ ENTRY(xen_failsafe_callback)
 	UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
 	pushq	$-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
 	ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
-	SAVE_REGS
-	CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
+	SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS
 	ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
 	jmp	error_exit
 END(xen_failsafe_callback)
@@ -1153,8 +1151,7 @@ idtentry machine_check		do_mce			has_err
 ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
 	UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
 	cld
-	SAVE_REGS 8
-	CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
+	SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS 8
 	ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
 	movl	$1, %ebx
 	movl	$MSR_GS_BASE, %ecx
@@ -1205,8 +1202,7 @@ END(paranoid_exit)
 ENTRY(error_entry)
 	UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
 	cld
-	SAVE_REGS 8
-	CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
+	SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS 8
 	ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
 	testb	$3, CS+8(%rsp)
 	jz	.Lerror_kernelspace
@@ -1393,18 +1389,34 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
 	pushq   (%rdx)		/* pt_regs->dx */
 	pushq   %rcx		/* pt_regs->cx */
 	pushq   %rax		/* pt_regs->ax */
+	/*
+	 * Sanitize registers of values that a speculation attack
+	 * might otherwise want to exploit. The lower registers are
+	 * likely clobbered well before they could be put to use in
+	 * a speculative execution gadget. Interleave XOR with PUSH
+	 * for better uop scheduling:
+	 */
 	pushq   %r8		/* pt_regs->r8 */
+	xorq    %r8, %r8	/* nospec   r8 */
 	pushq   %r9		/* pt_regs->r9 */
+	xorq    %r9, %r9	/* nospec   r9 */
 	pushq   %r10		/* pt_regs->r10 */
+	xorq    %r10, %r10	/* nospec   r10 */
 	pushq   %r11		/* pt_regs->r11 */
+	xorq    %r11, %r11	/* nospec   r11*/
 	pushq	%rbx		/* pt_regs->rbx */
+	xorl    %ebx, %ebx	/* nospec   rbx*/
 	pushq	%rbp		/* pt_regs->rbp */
+	xorl    %ebp, %ebp	/* nospec   rbp*/
 	pushq	%r12		/* pt_regs->r12 */
+	xorq    %r12, %r12	/* nospec   r12*/
 	pushq	%r13		/* pt_regs->r13 */
+	xorq    %r13, %r13	/* nospec   r13*/
 	pushq	%r14		/* pt_regs->r14 */
+	xorq    %r14, %r14	/* nospec   r14*/
 	pushq	%r15		/* pt_regs->r15 */
+	xorq    %r15, %r15	/* nospec   r15*/
 	UNWIND_HINT_REGS
-	CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
 	ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
 
 	/*