[PATCH 4.14 44/80] x86/ptrace: Fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@xxxxxxxxx>

commit 31a2fbb390fee4231281b939e1979e810f945415 upstream.

The index to access the threads ptrace_bps is controlled by userspace via
syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the
Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

The index can be controlled from:
    ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> ptrace_get_debugreg.

Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it access
thread->ptrace_bps.

Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: bp@xxxxxxxxx
Cc: hpa@xxxxxxxxx
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561476617-3759-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@xxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -651,9 +652,11 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg
 {
 	struct thread_struct *thread = &tsk->thread;
 	unsigned long val = 0;
+	int index = n;
 
 	if (n < HBP_NUM) {
-		struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
+		struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[index];
+		index = array_index_nospec(index, HBP_NUM);
 
 		if (bp)
 			val = bp->hw.info.address;