Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 3/8] bpf: lsm: provide attachment points for BPF LSM programs
From: KP Singh
Date: Fri Feb 21 2020 - 06:45:04 EST
On 20-Feb 15:49, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 2/20/2020 9:52 AM, KP Singh wrote:
> > From: KP Singh <kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Sorry about the heavy list pruning - the original set
> blows thunderbird up.
> > The BPF LSM programs are implemented as fexit trampolines to avoid the
> > overhead of retpolines. These programs cannot be attached to security_*
> > wrappers as there are quite a few security_* functions that do more than
> > just calling the LSM callbacks.
> > This was discussed on the lists in:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200123152440.28956-1-kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxxxx/T/#m068becce588a0cdf01913f368a97aea4c62d8266
> > Adding a NOP callback after all the static LSM callbacks are called has
> > the following benefits:
> > - The BPF programs run at the right stage of the security_* wrappers.
> > - They run after all the static LSM hooks allowed the operation,
> > therefore cannot allow an action that was already denied.
> I still say that the special call-out to BPF is unnecessary.
> I remain unconvinced by the arguments. You aren't doing anything
> so special that the general mechanism won't work.
The existing mechanism would work functionally, but the cost of an
indirect call for all the hooks, even those that are completely unused
is not really acceptable for KRSIâs use cases. Itâs easy to avoid and
I do think that what weâre doing here (with hooks being defined at
runtime) has significant functional differences from existing LSMs.
> > There are some hooks which do not call call_int_hooks or
> > call_void_hooks. It's not possible to call the bpf_lsm_* functions
> > without checking if there is BPF LSM program attached to these hooks.
> > This is added further in a subsequent patch. For now, these hooks are
> > marked as NO_BPF (i.e. attachment of BPF programs is not possible).