Re: [RFC][PATCH] almost certain bug in drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c:create_authenc_wr()

[Herbert Xu]

On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 10:47:01AM +0530, Ayush Sawal wrote:
> On 2/15/2020 11:45 AM, Al Viro wrote:
> 
> > 
> >         kctx_len = (ntohl(KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_V(aeadctx->key_ctx_hdr))
> > << 4)
> >                 - sizeof(chcr_req->key_ctx);
> > can't possibly be endian-safe.  Look: ->key_ctx_hdr is __be32.  And
> > KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_V is "shift up by 24 bits".  On little-endian hosts it
> > sees
> >         b0 b1 b2 b3
> > in memory, inteprets that into b0 + (b1 << 8) + (b2 << 16) + (b3 << 24),
> > shifts up by 24, resulting in b0 << 24, does ntohl (byteswap on l-e),
> > gets b0 and shifts that up by 4.  So we get b0 * 16 - sizeof(...).
> > 
> > Sounds reasonable, but on b-e we get
> > b3 + (b2 << 8) + (b1 << 16) + (b0 << 24), shift up by 24,
> > yielding b3 << 24, do ntohl (no-op on b-e) and then shift up by 4.
> > Resulting in b3 << 28 - sizeof(...), i.e. slightly under b3 * 256M.
> > 
> > Then we increase it some more and pass to alloc_skb() as size.
> > Somehow I doubt that we really want a quarter-gigabyte skb allocation
> > here...
> > 
> > Note that when you are building those values in
> > #define  FILL_KEY_CTX_HDR(ck_size, mk_size, d_ck, opad, ctx_len) \
> >                 htonl(KEY_CONTEXT_VALID_V(1) | \
> >                       KEY_CONTEXT_CK_SIZE_V((ck_size)) | \
> >                       KEY_CONTEXT_MK_SIZE_V(mk_size) | \
> >                       KEY_CONTEXT_DUAL_CK_V((d_ck)) | \
> >                       KEY_CONTEXT_OPAD_PRESENT_V((opad)) | \
> >                       KEY_CONTEXT_SALT_PRESENT_V(1) | \
> >                       KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_V((ctx_len)))
> > ctx_len ends up in the first octet (i.e. b0 in the above), which
> > matches the current behaviour on l-e.  If that's the intent, this
> > thing should've been
> >         kctx_len = (KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_G(ntohl(aeadctx->key_ctx_hdr))
> > << 4)
> >                 - sizeof(chcr_req->key_ctx);
> > instead - fetch after ntohl() we get (b0 << 24) + (b1 << 16) + (b2 << 8)
> > + b3,
> > shift it down by 24 (b0), resuling in b0 * 16 - sizeof(...) both on l-e
> > and
> > on b-e.
> > 
> > PS: when sparse warns you about endianness problems, it might be worth
> > checking
> > if there really is something wrong.  And I don't mean "slap __force cast
> > on it"...
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > <mailto:viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>>

Patch applied.  Thanks.
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
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