Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Introduce mseal

[Theo de Raadt]

Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> and using PROT_SEAL at mmap() time is similarly the same obvious
> notion of "map this, and then seal that mapping".

The usual way is:

    ptr = mmap(NULL, len PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, ...)

    initialize region between ptr, ptr+len

    mprotect(ptr, len, PROT_READ)
    mseal(ptr, len, 0);


Our source tree contains one place where a locking happens very close
to a mmap().

It is the shared-library-linker 'hints file', this is a file that gets
mapped PROT_READ and then we lock it.

It feels like that could be one operation?  It can't be.

        addr = (void *)mmap(0, hsize, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, hfd, 0);
        if (_dl_mmap_error(addr))
                goto bad_hints;

        hheader = (struct hints_header *)addr;
        if (HH_BADMAG(*hheader) || hheader->hh_ehints > hsize)
                goto bad_hints;

	/* couple more error checks */

	mimmutable(addr, hsize);
	close(hfd);
	return (0);
bad_hints:
	munmap(addr, hsize);
	...

See the problem?  It unmaps it if the contents are broken.  So even that
case cannot use something like "PROT_SEAL".

These are not hypotheticals.  I'm grepping an entire Unix kernel and
userland source tree, and I know what 100,000+ applications do.  I found
piece of code that could almost use it, but upon inspection it can't,
and it is obvious why: it is best idiom to allow a programmer to insert
an inspection operation between two disctinct operations, and especially
critical if the 2nd operation cannot be reversed.

Noone needs PROT_SEAL as a shortcut operation in mmap() or mprotect().

Throwing around ideas without proving their use in practice is very
unscientific.